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“The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down 
injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different 
from other men.” 
 
- President Lyndon B. Johnson 
 
 
  
1 
 
Introduction 
On the morning of the Indiana Democratic Presidential Primary on May 6, 2008, 
twelve nuns from St. Mary’s Convent near the University of Notre Dame were prevented 
from voting. Ironically, Sister Julie McGuire, an inspector at the polling place and a 
member of the convent herself, was forced to turn her fellow sisters away because they 
lacked the necessary photo identification required by Indiana’s new photo ID law. The 
story quickly gained national attention but it also shed light on a growing trend among 
the states in the wake of the 2000 presidential election. The controversy in Florida had 
convinced some that voter fraud was a common problem in U.S. elections. And so, within 
a few years, states like Indiana, Georgia and Arizona passed strict voter identification 
requirements in an effort to combat voter fraud and safeguard electoral confidence. 
However, as Richard Hasen explains, these laws were not so much about protecting the 
integrity of the election system as much as they were about manipulating the rules for 
political gain.
1
 
 The “ID epidemic” as I call it quickly spread across the country. According to the 
Brennan Center for Justice, in 2011 alone, thirty-four states introduced voter ID 
legislation.
2
 During that time, forty-one states introduced 180 restrictive laws, ranging 
from proof-of-citizenship requirements to reductions in the registration and early-voting 
periods. To be sure, most of these laws were not in effect for the 2012 presidential 
election and some are currently facing legal action. However, in Kansas, New Hampshire 
and Tennessee, voters were required to present photo identification. And by the 2014 
                                                 
1
 Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012), 5. 
2
 Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Voting Law Changes in 2012, October 
2012 (updated version), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/voting-law-changes-2012. 
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elections, as it stands now, Pennsylvania and South Carolina will also make similar 
requests of their voters. In light of these figures, we can clearly see a trend among the 
states to make voting more difficult on the part of voters. And because many of these 
restrictive laws disproportionately affect minority voters, the debate over voting rights 
has been renewed.  
 Because these voter ID laws are so new, the literature on them is somewhat 
limited. The data concerning the effects of such laws on voter turnout is largely 
inconclusive with conflicting studies showing increases and decreases in turnout where 
these laws exist.
3
 And even though more research has been done with respect to election 
fraud, there is still no evidence proving that voter fraud is as widespread as proponents of 
these laws have suggested.
4
 Nevertheless, that has not stopped state legislatures from 
implementing voter ID requirements. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to 
consider the pros or cons of photo identification laws. Instead, I wish to place these laws 
in the broad context of the history of voting rights since 1965.  As the title of this thesis 
suggests, my goal is to explain how the courts, Congress and the Department of Justice 
have enforced the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and how this history might inform their 
decisions concerning voter ID laws going forward. 
                                                 
3
 See Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, “Voter Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of 
Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 121, No. 
7 (May 2008), pp. 1737-1774. The authors point out the effect of voter fraud on turnout is still a “novel 
conjecture in the academic research on voter turnout.”However, they do submit that “perceptions of higher 
rates of voter fraud ought to correlate negatively with participation in the electoral process.” Much less is 
known about how voter ID laws affect turnout in jurisdictions where the public perception of voter fraud is 
high. 
4
 See Spencer Overton, “Voter Identification” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 4 (Feb. 2007), pp. 631-
681. According to the Carter-Baker Report of the Commission on Federal Election Reform, of the 196, 
139, 871 ballots cast between October 2002 and August 2005, federal officials only charged eight-nine 
individuals with “casting multiple votes, providing false information about their felon status, buying votes, 
submitting false voter registration information or voting improperly as a noncitizen. This represents a fraud 
rate of 0.000045%.” 
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 During every decennial redistricting cycle, we often hear civil rights leaders refer 
to racially gerrymandered districts as “second generation barriers to minority 
representation.” The phrase refers to the ways in which minority voting rights are denied 
or abridged other than by simply restricting access to the ballot. “First generation 
barriers” to voting rights therefore refer to those early devices and practices like literacy 
tests and poll taxes which did restrict access to the ballot for black voters in the Deep 
South. For the most part, these first generation barriers have disappeared altogether. As a 
result, most of the history of voting rights litigation concerns second generation issues 
such as proportional representation and the ability of minorities to elect their candidate of 
choice. However, I would argue that with the recent election laws sweeping the nation, 
we are seeing the rise of “third generation barriers” to voting rights in the form of strict 
voter ID laws, proof of citizenship requirements and other restrictive measures which 
essentially determine who is eligible to cast a ballot.
5
 
 I have also used these generational terms to classify the actions of the courts, 
Congress and the Justice Department in addressing these burdens on the right to vote over 
the years. As we will see in Chapter 1, the first generation was characterized by a 
deferential Supreme Court which interpreted Congress’ enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments very broadly. During this period, the Court 
empowered the Attorney General to suspend illegal voting devices and afforded the 
Justice Department great authority with which to enforce Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. 
                                                 
5
 Others have also begun to refer to these voter suppressive measures as “third generation” barriers. See 
Ryan P. Haygood, “The Past as Prologue: Defending Democracy Against Voter Suppression Tactics on the 
Eve of the 2012 Elections” Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Summer 2012), pp. 1019-1064. Ryan 
Haygood is the Director of the Political Participation Group of the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education 
Fund.  
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Over time, however, minority voters were then threatened by racially 
gerrymandered districts and discriminatory at-large election systems. This led to the 
second generation of voting rights cases in which the Court primarily addressed the issue 
of redistricting. However, as we will also see in Chapters 2 and 3, there were two phases 
to this period. During the first phase, the Court used the standard of proportional 
representation in reviewing redistricting plans. As a result, the DOJ had considerable 
latitude with which to review redistricting submissions. The second phase was defined by 
an ideological shift on the Court which rejected the standard of proportional 
representation and significantly reduced the ability of the Justice Department to enforce 
Section 5 of the Act. Following this change in the Court’s interpretation, the third 
generation has been defined by a growing skepticism and criticism of the VRA. More 
recently, the Court has raised serious constitutional concerns with the Act and in the 
latest challenge to the law it appears willing to strike down the statute. 
The recent voter ID laws have highlighted this tension between the courts and the 
Department of Justice with respect to their competing and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act. However, these voter ID laws have also exposed 
what many have perceived as an increased polarization in the DOJ’s decisions. These 
allegations have led many not only to question the DOJ’s ability to effectively enforce the 
VRA but whether the VRA is even necessary anymore. Of course, things have changed 
since 1965 and the Act has certainly achieved a great deal of success. But given the 
partisan interests at stake over these restrictive election laws, the Voting Rights Act may 
still be necessary after all.  
  
5 
 
Chapter 1: The Early Years 
“We have long been mindful that, where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted 
under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them 
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. The right to vote is too precious, too 
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.” 
- Justice William O. Douglas delivering the opinion of the Court in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 
The recent constitutional challenges to the Voting Rights Act are, in many ways, 
very similar to the first such Supreme Court cases during the mid-1960s. Indeed, Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer characterizes these recent cases as “replays” of the first cases which 
dealt with Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.
1
 However, as more states begin to implement photo identification 
requirements at the polls, the courts will not just be dealing with complex issues of 
redistricting or proportional representation anymore. As Alexander Keyssar argues, the 
questions concerning these photo identification requirements are essentially about access 
to the ballot.
2
 In this respect, we have come full circle since 1965 by returning to the 
question of ballot access. But in order to understand how Congress, the Department of 
Justice and the courts are treating this issue, it is important to begin with those very first 
cases whose implications are still felt today. 
The first generation of voting rights cases dealt with the fundamental question of 
access to the ballot. As we will see in this chapter, these cases concerned literacy tests 
and poll taxes which prevented minority voters from exercising their constitutional right 
to vote. In addressing these cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the authority granted to 
                                                 
1
 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, “Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act,” Florida State 
University Law Review, Vol. 36 (Fall 2008): 697-765.  
2
 Alexander Keyssar, “Voter Suppression Returns: Voting Rights and Partisan Practices,” Harvard 
Magazine (July-August 2012): 28-31. 
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Congress under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments very broadly, thus justifying 
Section 5 and the entire Voting Rights Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional 
enforcement powers. However, most recently, this view of congressional authority has 
come into question and the Court does not appear to be as deferential to Congress as 
before. Now, Congress and the Court will be forced to revisit the same questions first 
raised nearly fifty years ago although this time, the results may not be the same.  
***** 
The condition of black voters in the Deep South at the time of the presidential 
election of 1964 was no different than it was at the end of the nineteenth-century. Despite 
the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, hundreds of thousands of eligible 
black voters were denied their constitutional right to vote.  In places like Louisiana and 
Georgia, the number of black males registered to vote was as low as 4%.
3
 Little had 
changed over the course of a century where, by 1964, in Mississippi and Alabama, black 
registration was less than 10 percent and 24 percent, respectively.
4
 For many, it became 
increasingly clear that the federal government lacked the means necessary to enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and finally put an end to the widespread 
disenfranchisement of black voters in the South.  
                                                 
3
 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New 
York: Basic Books, 2009), 91-92. As Keyssar explains, immediately following the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, the number of registered black males actually increased and turnout in the Post-
Reconstruction South among blacks (and poor whites for that matter) was very high. But the effects were 
short-lived. “By the mid-1870s, many northern Republicans, including President Grant, had lost their 
enthusiasm for policing the South; preoccupied with an economic depression and labor conflict in the 
North, they wearily drifted toward a ‘let alone policy’” (85). As a result, registration and turnout for blacks 
fell to the single digits in the Deep South where it would remain for decades (92).  
4
 Ibid, 212. The turnout data in 1964 is important because this was the data used for the “coverage formula” 
in Section 4 (b) of the Voting Rights Act that determined which states would be “covered” under Section 5 
of the Act.  
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By the 1960s, the civil rights movement was gaining significant momentum but 
the Deep South seemed immune to the changing social and political attitudes of the rest 
of the nation. However, the incident in Selma, Alabama in March of 1965 known as 
“Bloody Sunday” sparked a national outcry by civil rights leaders. Eight days later, 
President Lyndon Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress and took his case before 
the nation for a comprehensive bill “designed to eliminate illegal barriers to the right to 
vote.”5 Two days after the president’s speech, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was 
introduced into Congress on March 17, 1965 and signed by the president in August of 
that year. However, in the years immediately following the passage of the VRA, many 
states in the South challenged the new law and continued to deny the franchise to black 
voters.  
I. Judicial Deference to Congressional Enforcement Powers 
 The first constitutional challenge of the new Voting Rights Act to reach the 
Supreme Court was South Carolina v. Katzenbach
6
. Less than six months after President 
Johnson had signed the bill, South Carolina argued that Congress exceeded its 
constitutional powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments when it passed the 
Voting Rights Act. The state challenged the most important provisions of the law, namely 
the coverage formula in Section 4, the suspension of literacy tests and the preclearance 
clause in Section 5. South Carolina believed that submitting voting related changes to the 
Attorney General for approval first before they could be enforced violated fundamental 
constitutional principles, among them the separation of powers and equal sovereignty of 
                                                 
5
 See President Lyndon B. Johnson’s speech to join session of Congress, March 15, 1965. 
http://www.greatamericandocuments.com/speeches/lbj-voting-rights.html  
6
 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
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states. While the Court agreed in principle that the Act “may have been an uncommon 
exercise of congressional power,” Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, noted 
“that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”7 
In brief, the Court held that the widespread and unabashed disenfranchisement of black 
voters in the South was enough to justify this burden on select states, however 
unconstitutional it may have appeared. 
At the heart of South Carolina v. Katzenbach is a fundamental issue with voting 
rights perhaps the most important one: access to the ballot. South Carolina, like many 
other states in the Deep South, had literacy requirements for voting. In 1895, the state 
constitution was amended so that any person who wished to vote had to be able to read a 
section of the state constitution or explain a section of the constitution to a poll manager.
8
 
Such literacy requirements were unanimously upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton County 
Board of Elections.
9
 Justice William Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, argued 
that such tests were permissible so long as they were not “merely [devices] to make racial 
discrimination easy.”10 However, these literacy tests in the South were not “fairly 
applied” and because “proving discrimination on a case-by-case basis was a laborious 
chore,” “discriminatory literacy tests were the most important devices for restricting 
voting by African Americans in the South.”11 Indeed, such “tests” and “devices” had a 
                                                 
7
 South Carolina at 334. 
8
 See South Carolina State Constitution, Article II, Section 6. 
9
 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
10
 Lassiter at 53. 
11
 Daniel Hayes Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen, Election Law: Cases and Materials (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2001), 31. 
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significantly discriminatory effect on the black electorate considering that 50 percent of 
all black males were illiterate at the time.
12
 
South Carolina defended the use of literacy tests by citing the Court’s ruling in 
Lassiter, “that [such devices] are not in themselves contrary to the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”13 However, in this case, the Court believed that in most of the states 
covered by the Act, including South Carolina, these “tests and devices” were “instituted 
with the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes and [were] administered in a discriminatory 
fashion for years.”14 Moreover, in many cases, as the Court explained, white voters 
“[were] excused altogether from the literacy and understanding tests, or [were] given 
easy versions, [were] given extensive help from voting officials and [were] registered 
despite serious errors in their answers.”15 In light of such findings, the Court identified a 
serious violation of the Equal Protection Clause and while it did not answer the question 
regarding the constitutionality of literacy tests, the Court did uphold the power of 
Congress to suspend them.
16
  
Once President Johnson signed the Act, seven states immediately became covered 
under Section 5 as prescribed by the coverage formula in Section 4.
17
 South Carolina 
believed that this violated the equal sovereignty of the states and that Congress “would be 
[robbing] the courts of their rightful constitutional role…to strike down statutes and 
                                                 
12
 Keyssar (2009), 89. 
13
 Katzenbach at 333. 
14
 Ibid. at 333-34. 
15
 Id. at 312. 
16
 Id. at 304. Congress amended the VRA in 1970 to include a nationwide ban on literacy tests. The 
Supreme Court upheld this ban that same year in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
17
 See Appendix 1. These states include Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, almost all of North 
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia By 1975, Alaska, Arizona and Texas were also covered in their 
entirety in addition to several counties in California, Florida, Michigan, New York and New Hampshire.  
10 
 
procedures.”18 Again, the Supreme Court argued otherwise. Not only was Congress 
authorized to do so under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment but the equality of the 
states argument had no bearing in this case. As Chief Justice Warren pointed out, “That 
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union and not to 
the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”19 In a brief rebuttal, the 
Court upheld the Act’s coverage formula as a “permissible method of dealing with a 
problem…in a limited geographic area”20 and after 1975, the coverage formula would 
remain intact and unchallenged.
21
  
The preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act is as controversial today as it 
was when South Carolina first challenged it. Section 5 requires a jurisdiction covered by 
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act to submit any voting related changes to the Attorney 
General for approval before they can be implemented or enforced.  In South Carolina, the 
Court acknowledged that many of the covered states “had resorted to the extraordinary 
stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating 
voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.”22 Thus, Section 5 was 
adopted in order to prevent states from circumventing the law. South Carolina argued that 
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in passing Section 5 but the Court, mindful 
                                                 
18
 Katzenbach at 325. 
19
 Ibid. at 328. 
20
 Id. 
21
 With the 1982 amendments, Congress established the procedures by which jurisdictions could “bail out” 
of Section 5 coverage. As of November 2012, dozens of counties, towns and school districts, most of which 
are in Virginia, have successfully bailed out of Section 5. See Appendix 1. 
22
 Katzenbach at 335.  
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of “these unique circumstances,” held that Congress acted in a “permissibly decisive 
manner” under the powers granted by Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.23  
The Court accepted these “stringent remedies” as legitimate efforts by Congress 
“to banish the blight of discrimination in voting.”24 However, in doing so, “it gave 
considerable deference to congressional determinations about the means necessary to 
‘enforce’ the Fifteenth Amendment.”25 This became the precedent for most of the early 
voting rights cases. During this “first generation” of cases, the courts rejected many suits 
filed by covered states based on federalism objections and violations of the separation-of-
powers doctrine. Instead, as Victor Andres Rodriquez has shown, the Court “generally 
accorded Congress great deference with respect to Section 5 and interpreted the Act’s 
provisions as being expansive in scope.”26 At this point in time, many jurisdictions in the 
South were still using literacy tests and poll taxes to deny blacks the right to vote and 
Congress needed, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, “an array of potent weapons 
against [this] evil” and the courts were willing to grant them such authority.  
II. Poll Taxes and Equal Protection 
Land-ownership and taxpaying requirements were among the many voting 
qualifications in post-revolutionary America. And while many states over time repealed these 
qualifications, states like Virginia continued to enforce the payment of a poll tax as a 
condition for voting in state elections well into the 1960s.  In Breedlove v. Suttles27, the 
                                                 
23
 Katzenbach at 335. 
24
 Ibid at 308. 
25
 Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. 
Gore (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 121. 
26
 Victor Andres Rodriguez, “Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of 
the End of Preclearance?” California Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 3 (May 2003): 786-787. 
27
 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
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Supreme Court unanimously upheld the use of a poll tax in state elections but, as with the 
fate of literacy tests, Congress moved to outlaw such discriminatory voting practices. The 
Twenty-fourth Amendment, which prohibited the use of poll taxes in federal elections, was 
ratified on January 23, 1964. Soon thereafter, with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress 
declared “that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some 
areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.”28 And 
so, under Section 10 of the Act, Congress empowered the Attorney General to suspend 
such poll taxes in the covered jurisdictions. The “test case” for such legislative authority 
was Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections
29
 in which Supreme Court was forced to 
revisit the matter of Congress’ authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.
30
 
The question before the Court in Harper was whether or not requiring the 
payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting was a form of “invidious 
discrimination” and, thus, constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Furthermore, if such a violation existed, was Congress authorized to abolish the use of 
poll taxes in state elections? The majority ruled in the affirmative, finding that “wealth, 
like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process.”31 The Court acknowledged, as it had in Lassiter, that the states have a 
                                                 
28
 Section 10 (a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=100&page=transcript 
29
 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
30The circumstances surrounding the Court’s ruling in Harper are quite remarkable and deserve some 
attention. As Richard Hasen explains, Harper initially began as a “6-3 per curiam summary affirmance 
upholding the state poll tax” (Hasen 2003, 37). However, upon reading a dissent written by Justice 
Goldberg who was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, Justice Black offered to put the 
case for a full hearing “expecting a similar 6-3 vote affirming the validity of the poll tax” (38). But, as 
Hasen further writes, Justices Brennan, Clark and White changed positions and Justice Black found himself 
in the minority with Justice Harlan.  
31
 Harper at 668. 
13 
 
right “to fix voting qualifications” but “to introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a 
measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.”32 As 
Justice Douglas put it, “Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be 
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause.”33 Voting qualifications 
constituted violations of the Equal Protection Clause if they were found to be “irrational” 
or “arbitrary” and the Court viewed poll taxes as such. Thus, according to the majority, 
abolishing poll taxes in state elections was within the powers granted to Congress by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan (joined by Justice Stewart) filed two 
separate dissenting opinions and as Alex Keyssar notes, “[They] may have had the more 
cogent and historically grounded legal argument.”34 They argued that “in holding the 
Virginia poll tax violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court departed from long-
established standards governing the application of that clause.”35 The three dissenting 
justices shared the majority’s sentiments regarding poll taxes but they did not consider 
them to be “necessarily irrational or arbitrary and therefore not under the scope of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”36 As Justice Black argued, poll taxes can be “reasonable” and 
“rational” either as a policy for revenue-collecting or simply for the “belief that voters 
who pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the State's welfare when they vote.”37 
But more importantly, as they argued, because poll taxes did not fall under the scope of 
                                                 
32
 Harper at 668. Interestingly enough, the Court seemed to believe that wealth was even less of an 
appropriate voting qualification than literacy since at least “the ability to read and write . . . has some 
relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot” (citing Lassiter at 51). 
33
 Ibid at 665. 
34
 Keyssar (2009), 219.  
35
 Harper at 681. 
36
 Keyssar, 219.  
37
 Harper at 674. 
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the Equal Protection Clause, it was not for the courts to “adopt a new political theory” 
concerning voting qualifications.
38
 
The Court’s ruling in Harper and subsequent property-owning and taxpaying 
requirement cases would eventually yield a new standard of “strict scrutiny that would 
loom large in later suffrage law.”39 Essentially, the state could not burden or condition the 
right to vote without proving it did so because of a “compelling state interest.” Moreover, 
such burdens and conditions “had to be tailored with great precision, so that ‘all those 
excluded,’ were clearly less interested in or affected by the election’s outcome than those 
who were permitted to vote.”40 This level of judicial scrutiny and the “innovative use of 
the equal protection clause”41 in Harper are characteristic of this “first generation” of 
voting rights cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of access to the ballot 
while also redefining Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. 
III. Literacy Tests and a Further Empowered Congress 
The threat of disenfranchisement for non-English speaking voters was just as real 
as it was for black voters who were subjected to unfair, discriminatory literacy 
requirements. In its original form, the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 did not explicitly 
provide for any immediate relief for members of language minority groups. Section 4 (e) 
prohibited the states from conditioning the right to vote on English literacy but made no 
mention of bilingual ballots or language assistance at the polls. The absence of such 
                                                 
38
 Harper at 674. 
39
 Keyssar (2009), 220 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Id. 
15 
 
measures quickly became an issue not limited to the covered jurisdictions of the South. 
By virtue of geography, Texas and Arizona saw a sharp rise in Mexican immigrants but 
by the 1960s, “hundreds of thousands of Puerto-Rican born residents were living in New 
York City,” many of whom “were being denied the franchise because of their inability to 
pass the state’s English-language literacy exam.”42 As a result, in Katzenbach v. 
Morgan
43, the Supreme Court was forced to rule on Congress’ authority to enforce the 
language provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the effects of which extended far beyond 
civil rights. 
The Supreme Court did not find literacy tests to be unconstitutional in Lassiter 
and it was certainly not prepared to say otherwise here. Rather, as Justice William 
Brennan noted, the Court’s task was limited to determining whether or not Section 4 (e) 
was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
44
 In a 7-2 decision, the majority held that while “the States have power to 
fix voting qualifications, they cannot do so contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment or any 
other constitutional provision.”45 Thus, Section 4 (e) “may be regarded as an enactment 
[by Congress] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.”46 In deciding this particular case, 
the Court not only offered Congress considerable latitude with respect to enforcing the 
Voting Rights Act. Indeed, as Richard Hasen argues, the Court also advocated for an 
“expansive view of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.”47 In other words, enforcing the Equal Protection Clause was not just 
reserved for the courts. Backed by the Supreme Court, Congress had the authority to 
enact legislation it believed would “secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”48 
Legal scholars have come to identify in Justice Brennan’s opinion a “ratchet 
theory” for congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. Essentially, 
“Congress could overenforce the Equal Protection Clause, but it could not take away 
basic equal protection guarantees recognized by the Court.”49 This significant showing of 
judicial deference to congressional enforcement powers was concerning for some, 
especially Justice John Marshall Harlan who saw such a move as a departure from the 
“fundamentals in the American constitutional system – the separation of legislative and 
judicial function and the boundaries between federal and state political authority.”50 
Justice Harlan of course voted with the majority in South Carolina in affirming 
Congress’ authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enforce the 
preclearance provision of the VRA. However, he argued that the language provisions of 
the VRA at question in Morgan were “a significantly different type of congressional 
enactment.”51 Section 5 of the VRA may have been a “justifiable exercise of 
congressional initiative” but in his opinion, questions concerning possible violations of 
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the Equal Protection Clause were those “for the judicial branch to ultimately determine,” 
not Congress.
52
 
Justice Brennan’s “ratchet theory” came under immediate attack by those who, 
like Justice Harlan, believed the Court was jeopardizing the principles of federalism and 
confusing the distinctive roles of the legislative and judicial branches. To be sure, Justice 
Brennan stipulated that Congress did not have the “power to exercise discretion in the 
other direction and to enact ‘statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due 
process decisions of this Court.’”53 However, some were unconvinced, arguing that “if 
Congress' interpretive power is grounded on special legislative competence not possessed by 
courts’… that competence should extend to a judgment that the courts have gone too far in 
expanding the scope of individual rights.”
54
 Even worse, some feared that such a “ratchet 
theory” could lead to a dilemma of “competing claims of constitutional rights.”
55
 As one 
jurist put it, “Could a congressional expansion of the power of courts to issue gag orders to 
the press in criminal cases be justified as an enhancement of fair trial without the necessity of 
any judicial determination of the freedom of the press issue?”
56
 Ultimately, the Court’s 
holdings in Morgan and other early voting rights cases yielded two separate readings of these 
decisions. Since the Court views “burdens” on the right to vote with strict scrutiny, is this 
expansive view of congressional power limited to voting rights or do these cases speak to a 
broader interpretation of Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments not limited to voting rights? Many have argued the latter suggesting that with 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, it seemed clear that Court was “widening the constitutional arc of 
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equality beyond mere race” and voting rights.
57
 In either case, the Court was certainly 
moving in the direction of conferring more authority on Congress. 
IV. Expanding the Scope of Preclearance   
Simply put, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had one goal: “to provide ballots for 
southern blacks.”58 Yet still, even after the courts struck down discriminatory tests and 
devices that kept black voters from the polls, it became clear that simply providing 
ballots for disenfranchised minorities was not enough. Minority voters in the Deep South 
were denied equal representation in their state legislatures because of racially 
gerrymandered districts and discriminatory at-large election systems. Such was the case 
in Reynolds v. Sims which led to Chief Justice Warren to declare, “The right of suffrage 
can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”59 As it was 
written, Section 5 of the VRA required states to submit to the Attorney General for 
approval any changes in the procedures for conducting their elections. It made no 
mention of submitting changes for election methods or as a result of redistricting but all 
that changed with Allen v. State Board of Elections.
60
 The Supreme Court significantly 
expanded the scope of preclearance to include such changes and as Abigail Thernstrom 
writes, “A law initially designed simply to open doors of electoral opportunity was 
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transformed into an effort to protect minorities from any measure that might weaken their 
electoral strength.”61 
Allen v. Board of Elections included several cases from Mississippi and Virginia 
(“consolidated on appeal and argued together”) concerning the application of Section 5. The 
appellants in each of the first three cases argued that certain amendments to the Mississippi 
Election Code were subject to preclearance. They included: (1) “at-large election of county 
supervisors instead of election by districts;” (2) “eliminated the option of electing or 
appointing superintendents of education in 11 counties and provided that they shall be 
appointed;” (3) certain “requirements for independent candidates running in general 
elections.”62 The fourth case concerned a challenge to a Virginia statute for handwritten 
write-in votes. Essentially, the Supreme Court had to interpret the language of the Voting 
Rights Act and determine exactly which changes in “standard, practice or procedure with 
respect to voting” were subject to preclearance.  
The majority in Allen interpreted Section 5 to cover virtually any and all changes 
to election law in a covered state regardless of how minor it may have seemed. In the 
words of Chief Justice Warren, “Congress apparently feared that the mere suspension of 
existing tests would not completely solve the problem, given the history some States had 
of simply enacting new and slightly different requirements with the same discriminatory 
effect. Not underestimating the ingenuity of those bent on preventing Negroes from 
voting, Congress therefore enacted § 5.”63 It was clear that each of the “practices” or 
“procedures” in question would have in some way disenfranchised black voters. 
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Switching from district to at-large voting for county offices would have certainly 
prevented a minority candidate of choice being elected in a majority-white county. 
Blacks would have been further excluded from the franchise by having certain county 
officers appointed rather than elected and by making it more difficult for independent 
candidates to appear on the ballot.
64
 Precisely for these reasons, Section 5 was created to 
guard against “racist mischief.”65  
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Allen would have a significant influence on future 
challenges to Section 5 for years to come. In his opinion, the provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act did not extend beyond questions of ballot access. As a result, redistricting 
plans or changes from district to at-large voting were not subject to preclearance because, 
as Justice Harlan argued, “Section 5 was not designed to implement new substantive 
policies.”66 Instead, Section 5 was designed to be the mechanism by which the 
protections of Section 4 were enforced. It could not require preclearance for changes that 
were not expressly stated elsewhere in the Act. For this reason, Justice Harlan understood 
“Section 5’s federal review procedure [to be] ancillary to Section 4's substantive 
commands”67 and accused the Court’s decision of “permitting the tail to wag the dog.” 68 
But perhaps the most important point in Justice Harlan’s dissent came when he 
questioned the Court’s allegedly unfounded preference for district systems over at-large 
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voting. As he stated, “It is not clear to me how a court would go about deciding whether 
an at-large system is to be preferred over a district system.”69 Justice Harlan’s doubts 
would be confirmed in future voting rights cases in which the Court was forced to 
established standards for preclearance by determining what constituted discriminatory 
“purpose and effect” and how the electoral franchise of minorities was best protected.  
Critics of the Court’s ruling in Allen, like Abigail Thernstrom who calls it a 
“radical decision,” acknowledge that “in the context of time and place, the Allen decision 
was on solid ground.”70 Even though minorities were now protected from literacy tests 
and poll taxes, they were being denied equal representation because of racial 
gerrymandering and discriminatory election systems. As a result, the Court supported a 
broad interpretation of Section 5 hoping to prohibit discriminatory election practices that 
were not limited to simply the design of paper ballots or poll locations. However, as 
Justice Harlan cautioned in his dissent, once the Court expanded the scope of Section 5, 
determining which changes should be precleared became more difficult in the absence of 
clear instructions or standards for preclearance. Not until 1976 did the Supreme Court 
establish a standard of “nonretrogression” in Beer v. United States.71 However, the 
question of standards for preclearance would remain disputed and unresolved for the next 
two decades as tensions arose between Congress and the courts. 
V. Extensions, Amendments and an Emboldened Congress  
Many of the most important provisions of the Voting Rights Act, including the ban 
on literacy tests and the preclearance requirement, were temporary. But in 1970, Congress 
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considered the reauthorization of the Act and the extension of these temporary provisions for 
an additional five years. Emboldened by the Court’s findings in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
Congress pushed forward with a nationwide ban on literacy tests. In addition, Section 5 was 
extended for another five year period but more importantly, Congress amended the coverage 
formula in Section 4. As a result, those jurisdictions which were accused of using 
discriminatory election practices in the 1968 presidential election were now covered under 
Section 5.
72
 In a matter of five years, federalism objections to the Act seemed to be a thing of 
the past. The 1970 amendments embodied the confidence with which Congress expanded the 
scope of Section 5 and strengthened the overall legislative authority of the Act.  
Congress again took up the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 1975. As with 
the 1970 amendments, the coverage formula was revised and the preclearance requirement 
was further extended to Alaska, Arizona and Texas.
73
 As Michael McDonald puts it, “The 
appetite of the majority in 1975 was to expand coverage, not reduce it.”
74
 Additionally, 
Congress extended Section 5 for eight years. However, this time around, Congress also 
amended the Act to include Section 203 which outlined certain procedures for assisting 
language minority groups in the appropriate jurisdictions. If a state or political subdivision 
met certain criteria, it had to provide “registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, 
assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including 
ballots, in the language of the applicable minority group, as well as in the English 
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language.”75 Now, the Act would protect language minorities from discriminatory 
practices and covered jurisdictions would have to meet even more requirements in order 
to obtain approval from the federal government. 
It is important to note that the 1970 and 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
were a reaction to the Supreme Court rulings in the cases mentioned in this chapter. Once the 
Court had supported the “stringent remedies” of the Act as it did in South Carolina, Morgan 
and Harper, Congress felt empowered enough not only to extend the temporary provisions of 
the Act but also to bring more states under its jurisdiction. Throughout the history of voting 
rights policy and litigation, this has often been characteristic of the relationship between 
Congress and the courts as the next chapters will discuss. The courts rule on Congress’ 
authority to enforce the Voting Rights Act and, with each reauthorization of the Act, 
Congress and the Department of Justice respond accordingly, sometimes contrary to the 
courts’ directives.  
***** 
 Each of the Supreme Court cases discussed in this chapter is representative of the first 
generation of voting rights. They all address issues related to ballot access and they all reflect 
a Supreme Court that is very deferential to Congress. As we saw in South Carolina, Morgan 
and Harper, the Supreme Court struck down literacy requirements and poll taxes while also 
expanding the reach of federal oversight and defending the authority of Congress to enforce 
Section 5. The Court acknowledged the unprecedented nature of these provisions but 
emphasized the unique circumstances in certain areas that justified such extraordinary 
measures. However, given the nature of the recent challenges to the VRA, these cases have a 
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renewed relevance to the conversation but they also appear to be in question. As Chief Justice 
John Roberts wrote in a recent opinion, “Some of the conditions that the Court relied upon in 
upholding this statutory scheme in [these cases] have unquestionably improved. Those 
improvements are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and 
stand as a monument to its success, but the Act imposes current burdens and must be 
justified by current needs.”76 Nevertheless, how the Court will treat these early voting 
rights cases in their assessment of photo identification laws and the current challenges to 
the VRA remains to be seen. 
 In continuing with our study of the history of congressional enforcement and 
judicial review of the VRA, we should look to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Allen and how 
that led to the evolving standards of preclearance and the so called “second generation” 
of voting rights cases. If we recall, Justice Harlan questioned “how the attorney general 
and the courts should decide which electoral procedures impermissibly discriminate 
against minority groups.”77 As Daniel Lowenstein and Richard Hasen have shown, with 
Beer v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed these issues by establishing the 
standard of “nonretrogression.”78 However, as Abigail Thernstrom puts it, “The [Beer] 
decision had only the most tenuous hold on voting rights enforcement.”79 We shall see in 
the next two chapters how the Beer decision introduced a period of competing 
interpretations and conflicting standards among the courts, Congress and the Department 
of Justice. 
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Chapter 2: The Battle Lines Are Drawn    
“The purpose of Section 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes 
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 
- Justice Potter Stewart delivering the opinion of the Court in Beer 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 
For the first fifteen years or so after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court, Congress and the Department of Justice were all in agreement, more or 
less, with respect to their interpretation and enforcement of the Act’s provisions. It was as 
one constitutional historian called it, a “golden age for civil liberties.”1 But by the 1980s, 
the courts and Congress often found themselves on opposing sides of the debate. The 
controversy surrounding minority voting rights became less about access to the ballot and 
more about proportional representation. Since then, the debate has been almost 
exclusively dominated by the issue of partisan gerrymandering. However, more recently, 
the courts and the Department of Justice have focused their attention on controversial 
photo identification laws. Therefore, in order to understand how the courts and the DOJ 
are handling this issue, it is necessary to examine the second generation cases which 
established the standards for preclearance still in use today.  
Second generation barriers are those which discriminate against minority voters in 
other ways than simply restricting access to the ballot, namely, racial gerrymandering. In 
this chapter, we will begin with the retrogression standard that emerged from Beer v. 
United States followed by the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden which elevated proof of discriminatory intent to a position never before seen in 
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voting rights litigation, at least not since the passage of the VRA.  We will then discuss 
how Congress responded to these landmark cases with the 1982 amendments and explain 
how this jockeying between the courts and Congress effected Section 5 enforcement 
during the 1980s and 1990s. To be sure, there will undoubtedly be a great deal of material 
that is either discussed briefly or left out entirely. After all, one could devote an entire 
thesis to the jurisprudence concerning redistricting alone. Instead, the purpose of this 
chapter is to simply illustrate the tension that developed and still exists today among the 
courts, the Department of Justice and Congress during this second generation  
I. The Nonretrogression Standard 
Once the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Section 5 to cover “all changes, 
no matter how small,”2 enforcing the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act 
became a more demanding bureaucratic process. For example, by 1970, the total number 
of preclearance requests submitted to the Department of Justice was 2,559.
3
 By 1980, it 
reached 38,184 and, five years later, over 80,000 Section 5 submissions were made.
4
 
However, it was unclear “under what standard the district court or the Attorney General 
had to use in assessing whether a district plan [or other voting change] had the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on racial grounds.”5 In Beer v. United States, the 
Supreme Court sought to establish such a standard. Whereas in the early voting rights 
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cases, the Court was addressing “constitutional inquiries” regarding the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Beer was now addressing a 
“question of statutory interpretation.”6 The Court determined for itself what Congress 
intended in drafting Section 5 and the result was the retrogression standard. However, the 
decision signaled “a retreat from the earlier, expansive interpretations of the Act” and 
represented “an aggressive Court doing what it [wanted] with the open-ended and 
forgiving language of the Voting Rights Act.”7  
After the 1970 census, the city of New Orleans adopted a new reapportionment 
plan for its council districts. As Timothy O’Rourke explains, the seven-member city 
council consisted of five ward seats and two at-large seats.
8
 Under the existing or 
“benchmark” plan, black voters constituted a majority in only one of the five wards 
despite the fact that 45 percent of the population was black. In the proposed plan, the 
percentage of registered voters in the majority-minority ward increased slightly from 50.2 
percent to 52.6 percent. The plan also increased the percentage of the black population in 
another ward from 49.4 to 50.6 percent but, as O’Rourke points out, they still “remained 
a minority of registered voters” in that ward.9 The United States in this case argued that 
the reapportionment plan had a discriminatory effect such that black voters were not 
afforded proportional representation. In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the 
majority argued otherwise, reversing a lower court’s ruling and approving the 
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reapportionment plan despite the fact that it did not did not reflect the potential power of 
black voters in the city of New Orleans. 
The Attorney General and the district court both denied preclearance for the 
reapportionment plan on the ground that it “inevitably would have the effect of diluting 
the maximum potential impact of the Negro vote.”10 In fact, the district court went even 
further by objecting to the plan because it still maintained two at-large seats in a city with 
a majority-white population. Although the plan did increase the minority population in 
two wards, the plan was accused of being discriminatory because it did not increase the 
voting strength of black voters by creating more majority-minority districts where 
possible. But Justice Stewart, along with four of his colleagues, argued that a proposed 
voting change had to be measured against the benchmark practice and not against what 
the Attorney General or a district court deemed to be the best case scenario. Such a 
narrow interpretation of Section 5 by the majority came from their reading of the 
legislative proceedings on the reauthorization of the VRA. Even though the word 
“retrogression” never appeared in the text of the Act or in the congressional hearings, 
Justice Stewart confidently asserted that “the purpose of Section 5 has always been to 
insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities.”11 
The dissenting justices criticized the majority’s departure from previous rulings in 
which Section 5 was afforded “‘the broadest possible scope’ to reach ‘any state 
enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way.’”12 In a 
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brief dissent, Justice White challenged the majority’s understanding of Section 5 to reach 
“only those changes in election procedures that are more burdensome to the complaining 
minority than pre-existing procedures.”13 According to Justice White, Section 5 is not 
“satisfied unless, to the extent practicable, the new electoral districts afford the Negro 
minority the opportunity to achieve legislative representation roughly proportional to the 
Negro population.”14 Interestingly enough, Justice White was simply repeating how the 
Court interpreted Section 5 only a year before in City of Richmond v. United States.
15
 In 
an opinion written by White himself, the Court held, “An annexation reducing the 
relative political strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared with what 
it was before the annexation does not violate Section 5 of the Act as long as the 
postannexation system fairly recognizes, as it does in this case, the minority's political 
potential.”16 However, this was clearly not the case with the reapportionment plan 
adopted by the city of New Orleans in which black voters were afforded the same 
representation in 1971 as they were in 1961, despite a significant rise in the black 
population.  
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, labeled the majority’s reading of 
Section 5 “an awkward construction” which “approves a blatantly discriminatory plan.”17 
In criticizing the retrogression standard, Marshall reminded the Court, “We have made 
clear that dilution of voting power refers to resulting voting strength that is something 
less than potential (i.e., proportional) power, not to a reduction of existing power.”18 
Justice Marshall took issue especially with the majority’s decision to separate the 
constitutional standard from the statutory one. As Marshall explained, “Section 5’s 
language plainly contemplates: whether, in absolute terms, the covered jurisdiction can 
show that its proposed plan meets the constitutional standard. Because it is consistent 
with both the statutory language and the legislative purposes, this is the proper 
construction of the provision.”19 In other words, because the statutory language is 
consistent with the constitutional standard of the Fifteenth Amendment, a violation of one 
is naturally a violation of the other.  
Ultimately, as Ellen Katz argues, the question in Beer was “how far beyond 
retrogression the Court understood Section 5 to extend.”20 By “ignoring the statutory 
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language,”21 as Justice Marshall stated, the majority limited Section 5’s application to 
constitutional violations alone. Such a narrow construction “offered a manageable 
standard that avoided the larger problems associated with White’s and Marshall’s 
approach,”22 but it essentially “allowed jurisdictions to maintain the status quo,” even 
when the status quo did not reflect the potential of minority voting strength.
23
 But, as 
Thernstrom has shown, Congress and the Department of Justice found “detours around 
retrogression” and “over time, Richmond’s standard prevailed.”24 Nevertheless, with 
Beer, the Supreme Court showed it was no longer going to interpret the provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act as expansively as it had before.  
II. Discriminatory Intent and an Aggressive Court  
In City of Mobile v. Bolden
25
, the Supreme Court, according to many observers at 
the time, dealt a significant blow to the Voting Rights Act. In order to establish a 
violation of Section 2 of the Act or of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that 
plaintiffs had to prove invidious discriminatory intent; simply proving the discriminatory 
effects of a reapportionment plan or other voting change was no longer enough. The 
Bolden decision was immediately criticized by civil rights advocates and election law 
experts alike. To begin with, as Frank R. Parker argued, the Court broke precedent with 
previous voter dilution cases in which the “totality of circumstances,” not intent or effect 
alone, would determine if a proposed change violated Section 2.
26
 Perhaps most 
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important was that the Court imposed “a more difficult standard of proof for minority 
plaintiffs to meet in challenging the constitutionality of [certain] election laws.”27 For 
years, those who challenged discriminatory election systems “enjoyed excellent success” 
but Bolden “disturbed this state of affairs.”28 The “expanded scope of the intent 
doctrine”29 in Bolden represented a Court that was growing evermore critical of voting 
rights litigation.  
Before Bolden, claims of voter dilution brought under Section 2 required a 
showing of discriminatory effect as well as a host of other factors such as history of 
discrimination or racially polarized voting. Frank R. Parker called this the “Whitcomb-
White-Zimmer formula,”30 a reference to two Supreme Court cases and one from the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals which all dealt with claims of voter dilution. In Whitcomb v. 
Chavis
31
, the Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proving discriminatory effect 
rests on the plaintiff. In White v. Regester
32
, the Court decided this burden was met under 
the standard of “totality of circumstances” which included showing “a history of 
discrimination, the existence of cultural and language barriers, racially divisive campaign 
appeals, limited numbers of minority-elected officials, a depressed socioeconomic status 
for a minority and the use of potentially discriminatory majority vote and numbered-post 
requirements.”33 When a circuit court of appeals “tracked almost exactly the [same] 
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evidentiary factors listed in Whitcomb and White” in Zimmer v. McKeithen34, the “results 
test” emerged as the legal precedent for establishing a constitutional violation for claims 
of voter dilution. But all of that changed with Bolden. 
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, believed that a in order to establish a 
constitutional violation, evidence of discriminatory intent was more important than any of 
the other circumstances considered in White. Indeed, Justice Stewart wrote that the 
Court’s decision in White was perfectly consistent with a previous ruling where the Court 
held that “the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”35 Justice Stewart then went on 
to completely “repudiate the Zimmer holding,” claiming it was based upon a 
“misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to 
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”36 Despite Stewart’s assertion that the 
Court was “applying an already established intent standard,” as Samuel Issacharoff 
argues, “Its holding was irreconcilable both with precedent and with the conventionally 
understood doctrinal basis of intent.”37 The “hostility to the relief [traditionally] afforded 
civil rights litigants” was unmistakable. With Bolden, the Court imposed an “onerous 
burden of proof”38 that made challenging discriminatory election practices exceedingly 
difficult.  
In his dissent, Justice Marshall called for a “fresh consideration” of the facts, 
acknowledging that, in the past, the Court had often adopted “inconsistent approaches” in 
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voter dilution cases.
39
 He disagreed with the plurality’s reading of Washington, saying, 
“To assume the Court intended covertly to overrule the discriminatory-effects test applied 
in White v. Regester without even citing White” would be an “unpalatable assumption.”40 
Justice Marshall went on to remind the Court that voter dilution cases “were premised on 
the infringement of a fundamental right, not on the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition 
of racial discrimination.” By applying the intent standard in a voter dilution case, the 
Court was “deviating from the principle”41 that “under traditional fundamental rights 
analysis, strict scrutiny did not follow from discriminatory intent but from impact upon 
protected rights.”42 But perhaps the most concerning issue for Justice Marshall was the 
Court’s silence as to what evidence would be required to show discriminatory intent. All 
of this led him to conclude that the Court’s ruling in Bolden, its “manipulation of 
doctrines” and “drawing of improper distinctions” had made it “an accessory to the 
perpetuation of racial discrimination.”43 
The Court’s ruling in Bolden represented a significant departure from the very 
first Supreme Court cases in which the Voting Rights Act was broadly interpreted and the 
threshold for proving constitutional violations was more easily met. The immediate 
effects of the Bolden decision suggested that it was nothing short of a major defeat for 
minority voting rights at the time. As Alex Keyssar explains, “Numerous [dilution] suits 
were dismissed or withdrawn, judgments reversed and challenges to at-large voting 
systems turned down in the lower courts because of the lack of evidence of deliberate 
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discrimination.”44 Thus, like Beer, the Bolden decision came to represent this second 
generation of voting rights in which the Court was no longer willing to interpret the 
provisions of the Act as broadly as it had before. But, with the reauthorization of the Act 
in 1982, Congress “quickly came to the rescue.”45  
III. The 1982 Amendments: Congress Strikes Back 
When Congress first amended the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and then again in 
1975, it strengthened the core provisions of the Act in response to the Court’s rulings 
upholding the constitutionality of the law. The 1982 amendments were also in response to 
the Court’s rulings, except this time, “the express purpose was to overrule the Court’s 
interpretation of Section 2 and thus eliminate the requirement of proving discriminatory 
intent in cases brought under that section.”46 Many in Congress were “unhappy” with the 
Bolden decision to say the least, and by rewriting the language of Section 2, Congress 
sought to restore the standard of “totality of circumstances” first articulated in White. 
Congressional amendments to the VRA which overturned the Court’s decisions became 
characteristic of the second generation of voting rights. The Court, “lost in a political 
thicket,”47 interpreted the language of the Act with inconsistent standards and Congress 
reclaimed the “lost ground” by rebuking the Court and amending the Act accordingly.  
As it was originally written, Section 2 was almost a word-for-word reiteration of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. But in response to Bolden, Congress amended the language of 
Section 2 as follows: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
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practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in 
a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.”48 The 
incorporation of the “results test” in Section 2 was a clear rebuttal of the Court’s findings 
in Bolden. But the 1982 amendments also included the addition of subsection (b) which 
reinstated the Whitcomb-White formula which the plurality in Bolden had rejected: 
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The 
extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the 
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: 
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
49
 
 
The last sentence of subsection (b) is especially noteworthy. As Justice Stevens stated in 
his concurring opinion in Bolden, never before had the Court “established a constitutional 
right to proportional representation for racial minorities.”50 Although, as he explained, 
states and jurisdictions were “not constitutionally prohibited from according some 
measure of proportional representation to a minority group,”51 they were certainly not 
required to do so. Thus, it appeared that Congress, while willing to upend the Court’s 
findings in Bolden, was not willing to go so far by extending to minorities the right to 
proportional representation which would have invited further judicial scrutiny of the Act.  
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 Perhaps more interesting than the 1982 amendments themselves were the House 
and Senate reports that accompanied them. In particular, the Senate’s Judiciary 
Committee issued a report that included several factors for the courts to consider when 
determining violations of Section 2.
52
 As Laughlin McDonald points out, these “readily 
verifiable factors” were almost entirely derived from White v. Regester, and, as in White, 
“the factors were illustrative, not exhaustive and no particular number had to be 
proved.”53 Congress wanted to be clear as to what constituted a violation of Section 2 and 
how that determination should be met rather than have the courts get lost in the statutory 
language of the Act and determine for themselves what Congress intended.
54
 
 In Rogers v. Lodge
55, the Supreme Court seemingly accepted Congress’ rejection 
of the Bolden decision. As Richard Hasen writes, only two days after Congress amended 
Section 2, the Court “appeared to backpedal from the discriminatory intent standard” by 
allowing plaintiffs “to prove discriminatory intent inferentially through proof of 
discriminatory effect.”56 Laughlin McDonald identifies two reasons for the sudden 
change: first, Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion in Bolden, was replaced by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, who voted for the plaintiffs in Rogers; and second, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger who, quoting one observer, “‘was stung by nationwide criticism of the 
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Bolden decision,’” switched his vote.57 True, as Alex Keyssar puts it, “The reign of 
Bolden was brief thanks to the happenstance of timing.” However, the intent standard 
would once again make another appearance in the Court’s rulings fifteen years later.   
 After 1982, the courts and Congress appeared to be on two different tracks with 
respect to their interpretation of the Act and how it addressed second generation barriers 
to minority voting. On one hand, the Supreme Court was moving in the direction of 
preventing the DOJ from making decisions about constitutional violations. It did so by 
severely limiting the application of Section 5 with the retrogression approach and 
burdening plaintiffs in Section 2 claims with the intent standard. On the other hand, 
Congress understood the statutory language to be consistent with the constitutional 
standards. Congress responded swiftly by amending Section 2 and instating the “results 
test” and the Department of Justice found ways around the rigid retrogression standard 
(which will be discussed later in this chapter). Thus, the 1982 amendments signified the 
fundamental differences between the courts and Congress and revealed a fracture in 
judicial and legislative framework of voting rights enforcement that had remained intact 
and in relative harmony since 1965.  
IV. The Supreme Court and the Amended Section 2 
In Thornburg v. Gingles
58
, the Supreme Court once again took up the issue of 
voter dilution. However, the Court went further in its assessment of the amended Section 
2 than it did in Rogers.  Rather than accept the list of factors set forth in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee report, the Court added to that list a “three-prong test” for 
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establishing a constitutional violation in cases brought under Section 2. Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, noted that the Senate’s report was “neither comprehensive nor 
exclusive “and that “other factors may also be relevant and may be considered.”59 As 
McDonald puts it, in the opinion of the Court, the factors listed in the Senate report were 
“deemed supportive of, but not essential to, a finding of voting rights violations.”60 While 
it may seem that the Court was only further complicating Section 2 litigation, as Richard 
Hasen states, “The Gingles framework has remained essentially intact.”61 Nevertheless, 
the “riot of opinions” in Gingles did prove that “the amendments of Section 2 had solved 
none of the definitional and normative problems so evident in the Fourteenth 
Amendments cases between 1971 and 1980.”62  
 Justice Brennan argued that in order to establish a violation of Section 2, minority 
plaintiffs had to meet three conditions: “First, the minority group must be able to 
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district. Second, the minority group must be able to show 
that it is politically cohesive. Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate.”63 With respect to the first two conditions, Justice Brennan stated, 
“Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the 
challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure 
or practice.”64 Furthermore, “If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be 
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said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority 
group interests.”65 In other words, minority voters must prove that they are large enough 
to constitute a majority in a single-member district and that a significant portion of the 
group votes for the same candidates otherwise, a violation of Section 2 does not exist.  
 As Abigail Thernstrom has shown, Justice Brennan’s third condition was met 
with skepticism on the part of the other members of the Court.
66
 He identified racially 
polarized voting to occur when a minority preferred candidate was defeated by the 
majority voting-age population. But Thernstrom considered Brennan’s interpretation to 
be an “‘implicit repudiation of Whitcomb’” which led Justice O’Connor to argue, 
“‘Amended §2 is intended to codify the ‘results’ test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis 
and White v. Regester’ but ‘the vote dilution analysis adopted by the Court today clearly 
bears little resemblance to the ‘results’ test that emerged in Whitcomb and White.’”67 
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran shared similar concerns with Brennan’s 
formulation.  They argued the Gingles framework had “serious shortcomings both 
statistically and substantively.”68 As they argue, the Gingles standard does not clearly 
define who qualifies as a minority candidate of choice especially since the Supreme 
Court has argued that such a person need not be a member of the minority group. 
Moreover, the Gingles decision does not address the serious question of how majority-
minority districts impact the substantive representation of minority interests. 
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Concentrated minority populations may in fact, as they propose, be counterproductive 
and the Gingles formula does not account for this. Thus, while the Gingles analysis may 
have “simplified decisions in voting rights cases and added greater predictability,” 
subsequent redistricting cases suggest that it did not resolve the issue entirely.
69
 
 Justice O’Connor argued that Section 2 was amended in order to return to the pre-
Bolden results test employed in voter dilution cases and, indeed, the legislative record 
supported such a view. In her special concurrence which Thernstrom states “read like a 
dissent,” Justice O’Connor was primarily concerned with Brennan’s “simple and 
invariable” definition of voter dilution and racial bloc voting.70 O’Connor argued that the 
Court did not address a critical question: “How much of an impairment of undiluted 
minority voting strength is necessary to prove vote dilution?”71 This question, one which 
“reflects a basic conflict on the Court about the core values at stake in voting cases,”72 
indicated O’Connor’s reservations about limiting the definition of voter dilution to the 
ability of minority groups to elect their preferred candidates.
73
 As Paul W. Jacobs and 
Timothy O’Rourke have argued, it is essentially a fundamental disagreement as to 
whether or not “protection against dilution is a group entitlement, or instead, an 
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individual entitlement.”74 Thus, Justice O’Connor’s ultimate concern with Justice 
Brennan’s approach was that it came “perilously close to establishing a group right to 
proportional representation, notwithstanding the proviso of amended Section 2.”75  
 The fallout from Thornburg v. Gingles cannot be emphasized enough. If the 
purpose of the Court was to “simplify” Section 2 litigation, one could argue, as many 
already have, that Gingles had the opposite effect. At present, the Court’s implicit 
endorsement of proportional representation in Gingles does not seem as controversial as 
it did in 1986, especially because of the Court’s findings in recent redistricting cases. 
Nonetheless, as Thernstrom summarizes, “[Gingles] left the lower courts and the 
Supreme Court in subsequent cases to struggle with making sense of two layers of 
complexity: the statue itself and the Court’s interpretation of it in its 1986 decision.”76 At 
the very least, the Gingles decision represented a badly divided Court and demonstrated 
that the 1982 amendments did little to resolve the complex issues that first emerged in 
Whitcomb and White. As the next section will explain, this tension that began to develop 
between Congress and the Court left the Department of Justice in a difficult position.  
V. Making Sense of the Situation: DOJ Enforcement After 1982  
Enforcing the Voting Rights Act has never been a small task for the Department 
of Justice. Needless to say, the persistent tinkering of the law by Congress and the courts 
over the years has made enforcing Section 5 even more difficult. As a result, the 
Department of Justice, but more specifically, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights 
Division, has been caught in middle as the courts and Congress have clashed over the 
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“proper” interpretation of the Act. But as the debate changed from the simple yet 
fundamental question of ballot access to the complicated yet controversial question of 
proportional representation, the DOJ quickly found itself at the center of the controversy. 
Applying the Court’s strict definition of retrogression to “second generation” barriers to 
voting was not exactly practical and when the Civil Rights Division interpreted 
retrogression to meet its needs, it was labeled by its critics as “lawless.”77 Similar 
criticisms were also raised when the Division tried to evade the discriminatory intent 
standard in the wake of Bolden. Nevertheless, as the following section will explain, the 
patterns of Section 5 enforcement over the years illustrate how the DOJ treated different 
issues at different times and, more importantly, how it responded to congressional 
amendments and the Supreme Court’s decisions.  
During the 1970s, a majority of the objections interposed by the Attorney General 
concerned discriminatory devices and at-large systems. These two changes alone 
accounted for 59 percent of all objections made between 1968 and 1979.
78
 Moreover, 77 
percent of all objections during that time were based on retrogression.
79
 What this 
suggests is that during the first generation of voting rights and especially after the Court’s 
ruling in Allen, Section 5 activity significantly increased and retrogression was the main 
legal basis of the DOJ’s determinations. However, the fallout from the intent requirement 
of Bolden and the 1982 amendments had a noticeable effect on Section 5 enforcement. 
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Instead of the results test or discriminatory intent or retrogressive effect emerging as the 
sole legal standard for Section 5 objections, they all became grounds for a denial of 
preclearance.
80
 And while some criticized the DOJ during this time for being “out-of-
control” and “outside-the-law,”81 the argument can be made that this was largely the 
doing of the Court’s conflicting decisions and Congress’ indiscernible standards. 
The distribution of objections made during the 1980s changed considerably. The 
Attorney General interposed twice as many objections to redistricting submissions than in 
the previous decade. A total of 165 redistricting plans were denied preclearance, which 
accounted for 38 percent of the total objections during that decade.
82
 More important, 
however, was the decline in determinations based on retrogression alone for redistricting 
submissions. As McCrary and Seaman explain, retrogressive effect was the basis for 40 
percent of the objections in the 1970s but, by the 1980s, the number had fallen to 35 
percent and by the 1990s it fell even further to 10 percent.
83
 On the other hand, 
“Objections based on purpose alone increased from seven (11 percent) in the 1970s to 
seventy-five (44 percent) during the next decade and 112 (58 percent) in the 1990s.”84  
Another noteworthy trend was the increasing number of objections based on a 
combination of discriminatory intent and retrogressive effect. During the 1980s, 24 
percent of redistricting submissions were denied preclearance because of this “combined 
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standard,” compared to 7 percent a decade earlier.85 However, in this respect, Abigail 
Thernstrom accuses the Justice Department of “assuming that effect and purpose were 
interchangeable concepts.”86 As she contends, “The Department of Justice moved 
perilously close to this position, frequently suggesting that jurisdictions refusing to 
implement an alternative, more racially “fair” plan were engaging in deliberate 
discrimination. And, with recourse to that option, Beer could be safely ignored.”87 Under 
the stewardship of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court shared such an opinion of 
Section 5 enforcement and, for the first time, the Court’s crosshairs were now focused 
squarely on the Department of Justice.  
Second-generation barriers to voting, especially racial gerrymandering, exposed 
the Department of Justice and the preclearance process to more scrutiny. There were 
those who criticized the Civil Rights Division for pursuing a political agenda in 
reviewing redistricting submissions but such accusations led one former Voting Section 
attorney to claim, “With only a few exceptions, political considerations have not entered 
into the application of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act in any national 
administration.”88 Nevertheless, the Rehnquist Court grew critical of the DOJ’s 
enforcement policies under Section 5 and in two landmark redistricting cases, the Court 
essentially reprimanded the Justice Department for its “maximization policy.” As 
Thernstrom submits, “‘Fairly’ drawn plans were those that gave blacks ‘safe’ seats in 
proportion to the black population – to the greatest degree possible. A plan that was not 
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‘fairly drawn’ was ‘retrogressive.’”89 Interestingly enough, the preclearance guidelines 
released by the DOJ in 1985 made no mention of creating the maximum number of 
majority-minority districts. Yet many argued the Voting Section objected to plans that 
did not create majority-minority districts where possible and, eventually, the issue came 
before the Supreme Court.  
In Shaw v. Reno
90
, the Supreme Court struck down a reapportionment plan in 
North Carolina finding that race-drive reapportionment legislation, in the absence of a 
compelling state interest, violates the Equal Protection Clause. However, as Richard 
Hasen has argued, “The Court failed to clearly define the nature of the injury, not even 
the elements necessary to prove it or who had standing to raise it.”91 But the post-Shaw 
redistricting cases sought to address this “lack of doctrinal clarity,”92 in particular, Miller 
v. Johnson
93
, in which the Court, as Thernstrom puts it, “put additional meat on the bare 
constitutional bones in Shaw.”94 In that decision, the majority reaffirmed its position in 
Shaw and criticized the Department of Justice for its “minority-district maximization 
policy.”95 Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy stated, “In utilizing 5 to 
require States to create majority-minority districts wherever possible, the Department of 
Justice expanded its authority under the statute beyond what Congress intended and we 
have upheld.” This judicial lambasting of the Department of Justice approached its peak 
in 1996 when a district court in Smith v. Beasley stated, “The Department of Justice in the 
                                                 
89
 Thernstrom (2009), 121. 
90
 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
91
 Hasen  (2003), 140.  
92
 Ibid, 141.  
93
 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
94
 Thernstrom, 148.  
95
 Hasen notes that in the Shaw line of redistricting cases, “the matters have been fleshed out, more or less, 
by a consistent five-member majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia and 
Thomas)” (140).  
47 
 
present case, as it had done in Miller, misunderstood its role under the preclearance 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The purpose of Section 5 review has been explained 
above and it does not require maximization; it is intended to prevent retrogression.”96  
To be sure, a great deal of the literature on redistricting and the debate between 
the courts and the DOJ has been noticeably omitted. However, the purpose of this section 
has not been to explain the jurisprudence concerning racial redistricting. Rather, this 
section attempts to illustrate the developing tension between the courts and the DOJ that 
came to characterize the second generation of voting rights. Of course, the fact that this 
tension began with the issue of redistricting is not inconsequential. The difficulty has 
been, and continues to be at present, that “given the correlation between race and partisan 
identification,”97 issues like redistricting and photo identification laws are particularly 
contentious. The purpose here is to point out the distinction the Court has made between 
“impermissible districting based on race and permissible districting based upon partisan 
affiliation.”98 It is of great importance because it appears that such a distinction between 
racially-motivated efforts and politically-driven ones is being extended to photo 
identification laws. 
***** 
 There can be no mistaking the dramatic change between the first and second 
generation of voting rights cases. To begin with, the courts and the Department of Justice 
had moved beyond the issue of ballot access to the more complicated question of 
proportional representation. But, in doing so, the two came into conflict with one another 
                                                 
96
 Thernstrom (2009), 125 quoting Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996). 
97
 Hasen (2003), 140.  
98
 Ibid. 
48 
 
and the more amiable relationship between them which defined the first generation soon 
became a thing of the past. The Court showed in Beer and Bolden that it was no longer 
willing to interpret the VRA as expansively as it had before. It did so by establishing the 
standards of retrogression and discriminatory intent. And although Congress effectively 
overturned the Court’s rulings with the 1982 amendments, such actions only served to 
further excite the tension which still exists today, if not more so.  
 The redistricting cases also highlighted the fundamental disagreements between 
the courts and the Department of Justice with respect to their competing interpretations of 
the Voting Rights Act. As we will see, the Supreme Court’s distinction between racially-
motivated efforts and politically-driven ones would have serious implications for future 
voting rights cases, especially the Court’s recent decision concerning Indiana’s photo 
identification requirement. But before we examine these specific voter identification 
laws, in the next chapter, we will look at several other important cases which also reveal 
an aggressive Court redefining discriminatory purpose and separating violations of 
Section 2 from those of Section 5.    
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Chapter 3: The Voting Rights Act in Transition 
“To permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this case requires 
state and local governments to cede far more of their powers to the Federal Government 
than the Civil War Amendments ever envisioned; and it requires the judiciary to cede far 
more of its power to interpret and enforce the Constitution than ever envisioned. The 
intrusion is all the more offensive to our constitutional system when it is recognized that 
the only values fostered are debatable assumptions about political theory which should 
properly be left to the local democratic process.” 
- Justice William Rehnquist dissenting in City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 
The latter half of the second generation of voting rights cases was marked by a 
noticeable ideological shift on the Supreme Court. As Victor Andres Rodriquez states, 
“The ascension of William Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice and the 
appointments of Justices Scalia and Thomas shifted the balance on the Court towards a 
more restrictive view of Congress’ constitutional enforcement powers.”1 This 
“conservative judicial activism”2 revealed itself in a series of decisions in which the 
Court, led by a consistent five-member majority of its more “conservative” members, 
limited Congress’ authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and became increasingly 
skeptical of the “federalism costs” inherent in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.3 
During this “second phase” or “new federalism revolution”4 as Richard Hasen calls it, the 
Court sought to prevent Congress and the Justice Department from making their own 
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determinations about constitutional violations while enforcing the Act, especially with 
respect to the questions of voter dilution and proportional representation. Given that this 
second phase has persisted for the last two decades, voting rights have been under the 
scrutiny of the Court for some time now and much of what the Court decided during this 
period has brought us to a point where many feel previous interpretations of Voting 
Rights Act and even the Act itself are in serious jeopardy.  
 We will begin this chapter by looking at two important Supreme Court decisions 
starting with Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent in City of Rome v. United States.5 Next, 
we will look at City of Boerne v. Flores in which the Court reversed its position regarding 
congressional enforcement powers. Also, in the next chapter, we will see the issue of 
discriminatory intent remerge and discuss how the Court’s findings in the Bossier Parish 
cases influenced the 2006 amendments to the Act which, in many ways, was a repeat of 
the aftermath of the Bolden decision. Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter will be to 
demonstrate how these cases represented a concerted effort by the Rehnquist Court to 
restrict the authority of Congress and the Justice Department and prevent them from 
making determinations about constitutional issues. Finally, we will conclude this chapter 
with Northwest Austin v. Holder, the most serious constitutional challenge to the Voting 
Rights Act since City of Rome. As we will see later, much of what the Court said in that 
case laid the foundation for future challenges to the Act, the result of which we see today 
with the most recent facial challenge to the law.  
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I. The Federalism Costs Become Too Costly  
In City of Rome v. United States, the Supreme Court reconsidered the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act for the first time in nearly fifteen years. The 
city of Rome, Georgia had made several voting-related changes, most of which were 
denied preclearance by the Attorney General because of the disparate effect they would 
have had on black voters. However, the city argued that since the Fifteenth Amendment 
only prohibited “purposeful racial discrimination in voting,” Congress could not “prohibit 
voting practices lacking discriminatory intent even if they [were] discriminatory in 
effect.”6 That Congress exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment was the 
same argument raised in South Carolina and Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, 
indeed recognized it as such when he said, “The appellants are asking us to do nothing 
less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.”7 However, then-Justice 
Rehnquist was willing to do exactly that as he explained in his dissent, the language of 
which “gained adherents” and “[raised] serious concerns about the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act.”8 
Many of the concerns Justice Rehnquist expressed in his dissent in Rome were 
similar to those first raised by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Morgan. Like Justice 
Harlan, who voted with the majority in South Carolina, Justice Rehnquist accepted the 
remedial actions of Congress to prevent purposeful discrimination. However, in judging 
the effects of certain election practices, Justice Rehnquist believed that Congress and, by 
extension, the Justice Department were making their own determinations about 
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constitutional violations which, as Justice Harlan emphasized, “was a question for the 
judicial branch ultimately to determine.”9 Justice Rehnquist echoed that sentiment when 
he stated, “Today's decision is nothing less than a total abdication of that authority, rather 
than an exercise of the deference due to a coordinate branch of the government.”10 He 
also went on to criticize the majority’s interpretation of discriminatory effect to include 
the ability of minority voters to elect a candidate of choice, arguing, “The enforcement 
provisions of the Civil War Amendments were not premised on the notion that Congress 
could empower a later generation of blacks to "get even" for wrongs inflicted on their 
forebears.”11 In doing so, Justice Rehnquist repeated the views of his predecessors in 
previous cases who also debated the necessity to afford minority voters proportional 
representation. In the end, for Justice Rehnquist preclearance requirement was a 
“straitjacket” on state sovereignty and he believed the majority was extending Congress’ 
remedial powers beyond what the Court had envisioned fifteen years earlier.
12
 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Rome was essentially a complete and 
comprehensive summary of every argument levied against the Voting Rights Act up until 
that time. It represented a fundamental opposition by some on the Court to “a broad view 
of federal government power to regulate state and local governing rules.”13 However, the 
majority in Rome reaffirmed the Court’s ruling in South Carolina and once again, the Act 
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was justified as an appropriate exercise of Congress’ authority under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  But changes in the membership of the Supreme Court, now led by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, signaled an end to such judicial deference. Rehnquist’s dissent in 
Rome clearly demonstrated how a conservative-leaning Court would treat voting rights 
enforcement in subsequent cases. 
Perhaps one of the most important cases decided by the Rehnquist Court was City 
of Boerne v. Flores.
14
 As Richard Hasen explains, the archbishop of San Antonio, Texas 
applied for a building permit to renovate a church in Boerne, Texas. When the city denied 
the permit because of zoning laws, the archbishop filed a suit under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
15
 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck 
down the RFRA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Boerne decision was a complete reversal of the Court’s 
findings in Morgan and such a restriction of congressional power would have serious 
implications for the future of the Voting Rights Act.  
Much of Justice Kennedy’s opinion relied on an “instructive” comparison of the 
RFRA and the Voting Rights Act.
16
 As he explained, the legislative history concerning 
the VRA showed that there were serious, constitutional violations of a fundamental right 
that justified the Act as “remedial, preventative legislation.”17 With regards to the RFRA, 
there was no such evidence of widespread “religious bigotry”18 which led Justice 
Kennedy to argue, “The RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
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preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”19 This distinction was made by the Court in order to 
distinguish between “enforcement” and “remedial” legislation and why Congress could 
enact one but not the other. As Justice Kennedy noted, “Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to 
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”20 In this 
way, as Richard Hasen has argued, the Court rejected Justice Brennan’s “ratchet theory” 
in Morgan which allowed Congress to “overenforce” the Fourteenth Amendment.21  
In order to determine the difference between “remedial” and “enforcement” 
legislation, the majority proposed a “congruence and proportionality test.”22 According to 
Justice Kennedy, “There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to 
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”23 Such language, as 
Rodriguez shows, represented the “Court’s concern that its own power to interpret the 
Constitution might be eroded if Congress could change the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment legislatively.”24 As this chapter will argue, this was a concern that defined 
the “second phase” of the second generation. The Rehnquist Court adopted a 
fundamentally different view of the Voting Rights Act, one which completely changed 
how Congress and the Justice Department should enforce it. Questions about proportional 
representation or the ability to elect a candidate of choice were questions of a 
constitutional nature for the Court to determine. At the very least, they were questions 
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about political theory that the Court believed should be left up to the democratic process, 
not Congress or the DOJ. Thus, as Rodriguez has argued, “The Court sought to protect its 
role as supreme expositor of the Constitution” and such a concern was the certainly 
underlying principle behind the Court’s ruling in Boerne. 
As others have argued and as this chapter will explain further, the Rehnquist 
Court became “increasingly responsive to the separation-of-powers objection in 
reviewing, and striking down, legislation authorized under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”25 For years, the Supreme Court rejected these federalism 
objections to the Voting Rights Act but with Boerne, the Rehnquist Court indicated that 
such objections to congressional enforcement powers were indeed appropriate. This 
dramatic reversal of the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was driven 
by what the Court saw as “institutional overreaching” by a Justice Department spurred on 
by an over-empowered Congress.
26
 Having dealt with Congress in Boerne, the Supreme 
Court then moved to limit the authority of the DOJ in two of its most controversial 
decisions since Bolden. 
II. Separating Intent from Effect: The Bossier Parish Cases 
The two most important features of the VRA are Sections 2 and 5. To summarize 
what previous chapters have explained at length, while Section 5 applies only to the 
covered jurisdictions prescribed by the Act, Section 2 applies to the entire country. In 
addition, the standards governing these two provisions are also different. Retrogression is 
the standard for Section 5 while violations of Section 2 are established using the “totality 
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of circumstances” standard. But, more importantly, the burden of proof shifts. Under 
Section 5, a covered jurisdiction must prove to the Attorney General that a proposed 
change will not have the purpose or effect of discriminating against minority voters. 
Under Section 2, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show such discrimination 
exists. But, as Abigail Thernstrom argues, the DOJ “ignored” these distinctions by 
“incorporating Section 2 into the legal standards governing the enforcement of Section 
5.”27 Such was the opinion of the Supreme Court in 2000 when the Court “curtailed [this] 
interpretive freedom Voting Section attorneys had been exercising”28 and emphasized 
that preclearance under Section 5 could not be conditioned on compliance with Section 2. 
After the 1990 census, the Bossier Parish School Board in Louisiana adopted a 
new redistricting plan for its school board elections. Under the original plan, there were 
no majority-minority districts and, despite opposition from local civil rights leaders, the 
new plan did not create any such districts. When the plan was submitted for preclearance, 
the Attorney General objected noting that “‘black residents [were] sufficiently numerous 
and geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in two single member 
districts.’”29 However, because the original plan did not have any majority-minority 
districts, a district court in Washington, D.C., upheld the new plan because it maintained 
the status-quo and, thus, was nonretrogressive. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld the district court’s judgment and found that “replacing the standards for §5 with 
                                                 
27
 Thernstrom (2009), 130. 
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) at 475 quoting Attorney General’s August 30, 
1993 objection letter. If we recall, phrases such as “sufficiently numerous” and “geographically compact” 
refer to the Gingles test used in Section 2 claims of voter dilution. Critics of the DOJ point to such 
objections as examples of the DOJ merging Section 2 standards with Section 5 enforcement. 
57 
 
§2…would contradict [the Court’s] longstanding interpretation of these two sections of 
the Act.”30 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Court 
“consistently understood Sections 2 and 5 to combat different evils and impose very 
different rules upon the States.”31 In Beer, the Court held that “§5 [was] designed to 
combat only those effects that are retrogressive.”32 Requiring a jurisdiction to meet this 
burden under Section 5 and satisfy the “results test” of Section 2 would be “to increase 
further the serious federalism costs already implicated by §5.”33 Justice O’Connor further 
explained that shifting “the focus of §5 from nonretrogression to vote dilution [would] 
change the §5 benchmark from a jurisdiction's existing plan to a hypothetical, undiluted 
plan.” As Abigail Thernstrom points out, such a hypothetical plan would 
“inescapably…be a plan ensuring minority office holding in proportion to the black 
population – a point which O’Connor did not mention” but one that Justice Stephen 
Breyer “explicitly acknowledged in his dissent.”34 Ultimately, the majority did not want 
the Justice Department using the standard of proportional representation, a standard 
which, although alluded to in previous redistricting cases, was never actually accepted by 
the Court.  
In Part III of O’Connor’s opinion, the Court addressed the appellant’s argument 
that “evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes the voting power of 
minorities is at least relevant in a §5 proceeding because it tends to prove that the 
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jurisdiction enacted its plan with a discriminatory ‘purpose.’”35 Citing its decision in 
Shaw v. Hunt
36
, the majority did not agree. As Justice O’Connor wrote, “That evidence of 
a plan's dilutive impact may be relevant to the §5 purpose inquiry does not, of course, 
mean that such evidence is dispositive of that inquiry. In fact, we have previously 
observed that a jurisdiction's single decision to choose a redistricting plan that has a 
dilutive impact does not, without more, suffice to establish that the jurisdiction acted with 
a discriminatory purpose.”37 In other words, the dilutive impact of a redistricting plan 
could not, on its own, prove discriminatory purpose under Section 5. However, Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg, who both voted with the majority, believed otherwise and did not 
join Part III of the majority’s opinion. 
Justice Breyer argued that evidence of dilutive impact should be given more 
consideration than the majority would suggest in determining preclearance for a 
redistricting plan. He offered the following example:  
Suppose that a covered jurisdiction is choosing between two new voting plans, A 
and B. Neither plan is retrogressive. Plan A violates every traditional districting 
principle, but from the perspective of minority representation, it maintains the 
status quo, thereby meeting the “effects” test of § 5. Plan B is basically consistent 
with traditional districting principles and it also creates one or two new majority-
minority districts (in a State where the number of such districts is significantly 
less than proportional to minority voting age population). Suppose further that the 
covered jurisdiction adopts Plan A. Without any other proposed evidence or 
justification, ordinary principles of logic and human experience suggest that the 
jurisdiction would likely have adopted Plan A with “the purpose . . . of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”38 
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Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s limited interpretation of “purpose” in Section 5, 
stating, “I can find nothing in the Court’s discussion that shows that Congress intended to 
restrict the meaning of the statutory word ‘purpose’ short of what the Constitution itself 
requires.” He argued that vote dilution was a “harm that Section 5 guards against” and the 
majority’s holdings in Part III would allow “unconstitutional plans adopted with an 
unconstitutional purpose” to obtain preclearance.39 
While seven justices may have agreed that the Attorney General could not deny 
preclearance because of a suspected violation of Section 2, the Court was more divided 
on the relationship between discriminatory purpose and effect.  These divisions became 
more pronounced when the case reached the Supreme Court again after having been 
initially remanded to the district court.
40
 This time, as Abigail Thernstrom explains, the 
Supreme Court had “to answer a question, that, surprisingly, had never been raised in the 
decades since Beer had been decided: Did the retrogression test for discrimination govern 
the question of unacceptable effect alone, or was it equally applicable to assessments of 
invidious purpose?”41 Simply put, could a redistricting plan (or other voting-related 
change for that matter), adopted with a discriminatory purpose but having a 
nonretrogressive effect, be precleared? In the most controversial decision since Bolden, 
five justices believed such a plan should be precleared. 
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Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Bossier Parish II, emphasized that after 
Beer, the Court has always understood the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of Section 5 to 
be limited to retrogression. True, the language of “denying” and “abridging” the right to 
vote appears elsewhere in the Act, namely in Section 2, and there the Court “has 
appropriately read ‘purpose’ to refer not only to retrogression, but to discrimination more 
generally.”42 However, as Justice Scalia stipulated, “Giving the language different 
meaning in §5 is faithful to the different context in which the term ‘abridging’ is used.”43 
Cases brought under Sections 2 and 5 are different by their very nature and the statutory 
language and standards governing them are equally so. As Justice Scalia explained: 
In §5 preclearance proceedings – which uniquely deal only and specifically with 
changes in voting procedures – the baseline is the status quo that is proposed to be 
changed: If the change ‘abridges the right to vote’ relative to the status quo, 
preclearance is denied, and the status quo (however discriminatory it may be) 
remains in effect. In §2 or Fifteenth Amendment proceedings, by contrast, which 
involve not only changes but (much more commonly) the status quo itself, the 
comparison must be made with a hypothetical alternative: If the status quo 
‘results in [an] abridgement of the right to vote’ or ‘abridge[s] [the right to vote]’ 
relative to what the right to vote ought to be, the status quo itself must be 
changed. 
 
Such a distinction was possible precisely because of the Court’s ruling in Bossier Parish I 
which held that preclearance under Section 5 cannot be denied because of a violation of 
Section 2. But, more importantly, the distinction was made because the Court did not 
want the career staff at the Justice Department to enforce Section 5 against “hypothetical 
alternatives.” The majority’s ruling significantly limited the scope of the “purpose” prong 
and the impact on Section 5 enforcement after Bossier Parish II was evidence of that.  
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 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Stevens, not only 
criticized the majority’s decision in Bossier Parish; he also criticized the Court’s ruling 
in Beer. As he stated in his thirty-page dissent, “The Court was mistaken in Beer when it 
restricted the effect prong of §5 to retrogression, and the Court is even more wrong today 
when it limits the clear text of §5 to the corresponding retrogressive purpose.”44 Justice 
Souter was “unconvinced” that “Congress intended preclearance of a plan not shown to 
be free of dilutive intent (let alone a plan shown to be intentionally discriminatory).”45 
Such a narrow construction of the “purpose” prong ignored the legislative record which 
clearly “illustrated exactly the sort of relentless bad faith on the part of covered 
jurisdictions that led to the enactment of §5.”46 Even if one were to accept the ruling in 
Beer that the “effects test” is strictly limited to retrogression, the dissenting justices 
argued that Congress surely could not have intended such an assumption to be made 
about the “intent” prong.47 It was the same argument Justices Marshall and White raised 
in their dissent in Beer and, as in this case, it was not enough to convince a majority of 
the Court.  
 The Court’s ruling in Bossier Parish II, as in Bolden, had a noticeable effect on 
DOJ enforcement. During the 1990s, forty-three percent of all objections interposed by 
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the Attorney General were based on intent alone.
48
 However, after Bossier Parish II but 
before 2006, “virtually all objections were based on effect.”49 Proving retrogressive intent 
on the part of a submitting jurisdiction was difficult and with Bossier Parish II, the 
“majority guaranteed that the number of objections [based on intent] would be very 
substantially reduced.”50 In fact, as McCrary and Seaman show, “At most, two of the 
forty-one objections were based on the elusive concept of retrogressive intent.” In light of 
such evidence, one could see why the authors considered Bossier Parish II to have been 
“the most transformative decision regarding Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act since the 
1976 opinion in Beer.”51  
 The Bossier Parish cases represented a Court “dissatisfied with the conduct of the 
DOJ in assessing preclearance submissions.” As Ellen Katz states, “In the Court’s view, 
the DOJ spent more than a decade implementing a ‘black maximization’ policy under 
which it required covered jurisdictions to draw the maximum number of black-majority 
districts possible, regardless of their contours or the communities of interest they 
encompass. In pursuit of this ‘policy,’ the DOJ is said to have denied preclearance based 
on unreasonable constructions of Section5.”52 For the Rehnquist Court, these 
“unreasonable constructions” included applying Section 2 standards to the preclearance 
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process and misinterpreting the “purpose” prong of Section 5. And even though these 
“opinions did not contain the biting criticism of the DOJ that is prevalent in other 
decisions, [they] still reflected the skepticism with which the Court views DOJ conduct in 
this realm.”53 With each case during this second phase, the Rehnquist Court grew more 
skeptical of the DOJ and more receptive to the separation-of-powers objections. 
However, despite whatever concerns the Court may have expressed, Congress was not 
willing to part ways with the law when it considered its reauthorization in 2006. 
III. The 2006 Amendments: Congress Strikes Back (Again) 
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, the express purpose was 
to overturn the Bolden decision. Similarly, when Congress reauthorized the Act in 2006, 
the law was amended in order to overturn the Court’s ruling in Bossier Parish II. As 
Abigail Thernstrom states, “The point was clear: Section 5, as it was understood before 
the 2000 decision in Bossier Parish, had to be restored.”54And so, intent became once 
again “a stand-alone question”55 and the “mere evidence of discriminatory purpose – 
regardless of whether such purpose seeks to make minorities worse off than the status 
quo – [was] grounds for a denial of preclearance.”56 Thus, the 2006 reauthorization, like 
the amendments of 1982, was characteristic of the second generation in which Congress 
rebuked the Court for its controversial interpretations of the Act and amended the 
statutory language accordingly. 
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For the most part, there were few changes to the VRA with the 2006 
reauthorization. As Nathaniel Persily states, “The same jurisdictions remained covered, 
the bailout procedures remained intact, the DOJ retained its special place in the 
preclearance regime and the legislation was reauthorized once again for twenty-five 
years.”57 However, the few changes that were made were very important. As it was 
originally written in 1965, Section 5 “said that no voting change could be precleared 
unless the D.C. Court or the Justice Department had found it did not ‘have the purpose 
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color.’”58 As Thernstrom explains, “The ‘and’ had united the two terms, implying they 
should be read together, which meant that the standard governing ‘effect’ (retrogression) 
also governed intent.”59 This was how the Court read Section 5 in Bossier Parish II. But, 
as Thernstrom continues, with the 2006 reauthorization, the Act “separated the two terms, 
permitting a definition of intent independent from effect. Under the revised statute, 
jurisdictions had the burden of proving that voting changes would have ‘neither’ the 
purpose ‘nor’ the effect of denying or abridging voting rights.”60 Even in the absence of 
retrogressive effect, under the amended Section 5, the DOJ could deny preclearance if it 
found evidence of discriminatory purpose. 
As with the previous reauthorizations of the Act, Congress compiled a long and 
detailed record of evidence and testimony relating to voter discrimination. Indeed, as 
Kristen Clarke writes, “The record amassed by Congress during the 2006 reauthorization 
bears remarkable resemblance to the record underlying the 1975 reauthorization and the 
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record underlying the 1982 reauthorization.”61 Altogether, the House and the Senate 
compiled over 20,000 pages of records, including over 4,000 pages of Section 5 
objections letters from the DOJ and other “formal legal documents such as complaints 
and consent decrees.”62 Dozens of witnesses appeared before congressional hearings as 
well as many election officials and experts who testified to the effectiveness of Section 5 
and the other provisions of the VRA. Ultimately, this comprehensive record served to 
justify Section 5 by illustrating the presence of “increasingly sophisticated forms of 
discrimination in the covered jurisdictions.”63  
With the 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, the legislative record 
amassed by Congress may have been more important than the changes Congress actually 
made to the legislation. Of course, this is not to say that the changes were insignificant. 
Overturning the Court’s decision in Bossier Parish II, even if it was done by only 
changing a few words in Section 5, was significant in its own right. Nevertheless, the 
sheer size of the record indicated that “[Congress’] approach was deliberative, thoughtful 
and comprehensive in scope.”64 However, the “veneer of bipartisanship” in the final vote 
“glossed over serious disagreements between the parties” over the new VRA. It was these 
same disagreements that led many observers to predict that the Act would be “doomed” 
the next time the Court considered its constitutionality.
65
 And yet, as the next section will 
discuss, when a case challenging the law reached the Supreme Court, the Court was not 
willing to strike down the Act although it came dangerously close to doing exactly that.  
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IV. The Voting Rights Act in Peril: NAMUDNO v. Holder 
Soon after Congress extended the Voting Rights Act for an additional twenty-five 
year period, a small utility district in Austin, Texas challenged the law. In Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
66
, the district argued that under 
the bailout procedures set forth in Section 4 (a) of the Act, it should be released from the 
preclearance requirements of Section 5. But, more importantly, the appellants challenged 
the constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization. It was the first major challenge to the 
law since City of Rome and, given the leanings of the Roberts Court, many observers 
feared the Court would strike down Section 5. The law and the manner in which it was 
enforced had been under the scrutiny of the Rehnquist Court for the greater part of the 
last decade. And under Chief Justice John Roberts, a similar skepticism and concern for 
the “federalism costs” still resonated with the conservative majority. Nevertheless, as one 
commentator put it, “The thunderous case ended in a whimper.”67 The Court chose not to 
rule on the constitutionality of law but instead allowed the utility district to bailout from 
Section 5 coverage. However, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion was anything but a ringing 
endorsement of the preclearance provision. It was clear after NAMUDNO that the Voting 
Rights Act was in serious jeopardy.  
A district court in Washington, D.C. ruled that the utility district was ineligible to 
bail out from Section 5 coverage because the bailout procedures in Section 4 (a) only 
applied to states and political subdivisions. The district court argued that according to the 
statute, a political subdivision only referred to counties, parishes or other subunits that 
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registered voters. However, the Supreme Court did not interpret the term so narrowly. 
Referring to the 1982 amendments, Chief Justice Roberts argued that “piecemeal bailout” 
was indeed permitted and that Section 5 does not treat each “governmental unit as the 
State itself.”68 As he stated, the government’s argument against the district being 
considered a political subdivision “would render even counties unable to seek bailout so 
long as their State was covered.” The ability of a political subdivision to bail out of 
Section 5 coverage did not depend on the matter of the state’s coverage and on this issue, 
the Court was unanimous. 
69
 
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court did not rule on the 
constitutionality of Section 5 since it granted the appellant relief from the statute by 
allowing it to bail out from coverage.
70
 However, as Ellen Katz writes, although Chief 
Justice Roberts avoided striking down the statute, he “nevertheless displaced the district 
court’s broad opinion and, along the way, made clear how he would resolve the 
constitutional question.”71 He acknowledged that “the historical accomplishments of the 
Voting Rights Act are undeniable” but noted that “things have changed in the South.”72 
As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “Some of the conditions that we relied upon in 
upholding this statutory scheme in Katzenbach and City of Rome have unquestionably 
improved. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly 
                                                 
68
 NAMUDNO at 209. 
69
 Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part. He agreed that the utility district 
should be permitted to bail out from Section 5 coverage but he did not believe the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance was appropriate in this case. Justice Thomas devoted the majority of his opinion challenging the 
constitutionality of Section 5.  
70
 The district court did not avoid this question and upheld the statute against the constitutional challenge. 
See 573 F. Supp. 2d 221. 
71
 Ellen D. Katz, “From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO,” Florida Law Review, Vol. 61 (Dec. 2009): 991-
1000. 
72
 NAMUDNO at 200. 
68 
 
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office 
at unprecedented levels.”73 Of course, as he admits, “These improvements are no doubt 
due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and stand as a monument to its 
success.”74 But, as Chief Justice Roberts famously stated, “The Act imposes current 
burdens and must be justified by current needs.”75  
Ellen Katz argues that the language in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion can be best 
understood as “operative holding – one that strikes down the statute but stays the order 
until the next case in which the question is observed.”76 Such a case is currently before 
the Court but exactly how the Court will use its findings in NAMUDNO to inform its 
decision there remains to be seen.
77
 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in this 
case suggests that he shared the same concerns with the VRA as his predecessor, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist. NAMUDNO serves as an example of this “second phase” of 
the second generation in which the Court, under the stewardship of Chief Justices 
Rehnquist and Roberts, has grown more skeptical of the Voting Rights Act and how it 
was being enforced by the Justice Department. As this chapter has shown, these 
“federalism concerns” came out of the second generation cases concerning voter dilution 
and proportional representation. Looking ahead, how the Court handled those federalism 
objections may indicate how it will deal with similar arguments as the discussion turns to 
photo identification laws and the fundamental question of ballot access.  
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***** 
 As we explained in the previous chapter, second generation barriers are those 
which discriminate against minority voters in other ways than simply restricting access to 
the ballot, namely, racial gerrymandering. Thus, when we say “second generation cases,” 
we are referring specifically to the early redistricting cases which concerned voter 
dilution and raised the question of proportional representation. But, as this chapter has 
argued, during the second generation there was a noticeable ideological shift on the 
Supreme Court. Under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, proportional representation was 
rejected as the standard for approving redistricting submissions. Congress’ enforcement 
powers were significantly reduced after Boerne and Section 5 enforcement was greatly 
restricted after the Bossier Parish cases. More importantly, as the current Roberts Court 
has shown, the Court has become more receptive to the federalism objections brought up 
against the Voting Rights Act.  Together, these decisions by the Court shaped this 
“second phase” of the second generation and it has brought us to a point where the 
likelihood of the Act being struck down is greater than ever before.  
 Now that we have examined the history of voting rights litigation and 
enforcement up until NAMUDNO, we can move onto the discussion of photo 
identification laws. As we will see in the next chapter, the very nature of these voter 
identification laws suggests that we have come full circle since 1965 by returning to the 
fundamental question of ballot access. The Supreme Court decisions, the legislative 
history and the record of DOJ enforcement since then will likely have a great influence 
on how these three parties deal with these photo ID laws. As we will also see, many of 
the states which have implemented such laws have defended their right to regulate and 
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secure the integrity of their elections from voter fraud. These justifications for ID laws 
have refueled the federalism debate surrounding the VRA at a time when the law is 
especially vulnerable to such arguments given the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.  
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Chapter 4: Photo ID Laws and the “Third Generation” 
“In particular, the [Supreme] Court has not specifically addressed how the retrogression 
test applies to ‘ballot access’ laws (e.g., laws governing the procedures for voting and 
voter registration) such as the ones before us. Indeed, the case law interpreting the 
section 5 effect test deals primarily with so called ‘second generation barriers . . . to 
preventing minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process.’ There are no 
cases squarely addressing how the retrogression analysis should function in a ballot 
access case like this one.” 
- Per curiam opinion of the District Court in Florida v. United 
States, F. Supp. 2d., No. 11-1428 (2012). 
 
After the debacle in Florida during the 2000 presidential election, a partisan war 
erupted over election procedures and administration. As Richard Hasen describes it, “It 
was a voting war between the ideals of integrity and access, between preventing fraud 
and assuring enfranchisement and between Democratic officials looking to benefit 
Democratic candidates and Republican officials looking to benefit Republican 
candidates.”1 In the years since the 2000 presidential election, many states have tightened 
their election rules in an attempt to restore confidence in their electoral systems. Many of 
these efforts include proof of citizenship requirements, shorter early-voting periods, and, 
most notably, photo identification laws. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, 
during the 2011 legislative session alone, at least thirty-four states introduced voter 
identification legislation.
2
 This figure is particularly surprising considering that before 
2006, no states required voters to show photo identification at the polls. The sudden push 
for such restrictive voting qualifications has naturally renewed the debate over minority 
voting rights. Second generation issues such as racial gerrymandering are no longer the 
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only barriers to minority voters. With photo ID laws, we have entered into a “third 
generation” that bears a striking resemblance to the first generation.  
In the previous three chapters, we discussed the legislative and judicial history of 
voting rights litigation in an effort to trace the development of Section 5 enforcement 
since 1965. As we learned, most of the standards of preclearance used by the courts and 
the Justice Department today arose from those second generation cases concerning 
redistricting. In this chapter, we will examine how these standards, which addressed 
issues of proportional representation, are being applied to photo identification laws which 
deal with the entirely different question of ballot access. We will begin with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board3. In that case, the Court 
upheld Indiana’s voter ID law. We will then look at how the Justice Department and the 
lower courts treated two controversial photo ID laws in Texas and South Carolina. 
Finally, we will conclude the chapter by looking briefly at Georgia’s voter ID law and the 
controversy surrounding the Justice Department’s decision in that case. Ultimately, the 
purpose of this chapter will be to show that the courts and the DOJ are using standards 
which were not designed to deal specifically with “ballot access laws” such as photo ID 
requirements. As a result, this has led to many controversial and even conflicting 
decisions by the courts and the DOJ.  
I. The Supreme Court Weighs In 
In 2005, the Indiana state legislature passed a law requiring its voters to present a 
valid form of government-issued photo identification before casting a regular ballot in 
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any election. The law passed both chambers of the state legislature in a “stunning partisan 
vote.”4 As Alex Keyssar explains, “No Republicans voted against it, while no Democrats 
voted for it.”5 At the time, the law was the strictest of its kind. Although several other 
states requested photo identification, Indiana became the first to require government-
issued photo ID at the polls.
6
 The law was immediately challenged but a district court and 
a court of appeals both upheld Indiana’s photo ID law claiming that the law imposed only 
a minor burden on voters who did not have the requisite ID. In the fall of 2007, the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. 
 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for the Court which upheld the photo 
ID law in a 6-3 decision. Beginning with the standard established in Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections
7, Justice Stevens wrote, “Even rational restrictions on the right to vote 
are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications.”8 However, in Andersen v. 
Celebrezze
9, the Court “confirmed the general rule that ‘evenhanded restrictions that 
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself’ are not invidious and 
satisfy the standard set forth in Harper.”10 In other words, not all burdens on the right to 
vote are unconstitutional if they are imposed in order to protect the integrity of elections. 
This led Justice Stevens to cite two more cases, Norman v. Reed
11
 and Burdick v. 
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Takushi
12
, both of which applied the balancing approach used in Andersen. Thus, in 
determining the validity of Indiana’s voter ID law, Justice Stevens began his opinion with 
an analysis of the state’s interest in passing the law and weighing them against the 
burdens the law imposed on the voters.  
 The state identified three interests by requiring photo ID at the polls: (1) 
“deterring and detecting voter fraud;” (2) “preventing voter fraud;” (3) “safeguarding 
voter confidence.”13 However, as Justice Stevens pointed out, “The only kind of voter 
fraud that [this law] addresses is in-person voter impersonation” and the state could not 
provide any evidence of such fraud “at any time in its history.”14 Nevertheless, even in 
the absence of such evidence, Justice Stevens declared that the state still had a legitimate 
interest in protecting and preserving the integrity of its elections. As he stated, “While the 
most effective method of preventing election fraud may be well debatable, the propriety 
of doing so is perfectly clear.”15 And with respect to the petitioner’s claim that the law 
was motivated by partisan interests, Justice Stevens responded, “If a nondiscriminatory 
law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be 
disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided motivation for the votes 
of individual legislators.”16 Despite the apparent partisan motivations and the lack of 
evidence for voter fraud, Justice Stevens demonstrated great deference to the state’s 
interests in upholding the photo ID law.  
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 Using the balancing approach, the majority argued that the burdens imposed on 
the voters in Indiana did not outweigh the state’s valid interest in protecting its elections. 
As Justice Stevens wrote, “For most voters who need [photo ID], the inconvenience of 
making a trip to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a 
photography surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even 
represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.”17 To begin with, Justice 
Stevens cited the findings of the district court judge who “estimated that 99% of 
Indiana’s voting age population already possessed the necessary photo identification.”18 
Moreover, the burden imposed on those who did not have the necessary photo ID was 
mitigated by the fact that the state provided free photo identification cards to registered 
voters and those who still did not possess the required photo ID could cast provisional 
ballots. Ultimately, the petitioners could not provide a single compelling case of a voter 
unfairly burdened by the law. Because of this, Justice Stevens concluded, “A facial 
challenge must fail where the statue has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’”19 In other words, 
the Indiana photo ID law must be considered broadly as it applies to all voters. In this 
way, the Court ruled that the photo ID requirement imposes only a limited burden on 
voters’ rights not sufficient enough to outweigh the state’s “precise interests.”20 
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, wrote a separate opinion 
concurring in judgment. Rather than use the balancing approach of Burdick, Justice 
Scalia preferred a “two-track approach.” As David Williams explains, one track would 
apply the standard of “strict scrutiny” to “severe burdens” on the right to vote, “meaning 
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that such burdens will be upheld only if they serve a truly compelling state interest in the 
least burdensome way possible.”21 On the other track, “The Court should treat with 
deference those ‘ordinary and widespread burdens’ that are ‘merely inconvenient.’”22 
According to Justice Scalia, Indiana’s photo ID law was governed by this “second track.” 
That “some voters” were burdened or effected by the law was inconsequential. Justice 
Scalia emphasized that the standard of strict scrutiny was “reserved for laws that severely 
restrict the right to vote.”23 When considering the effects of the Indiana law “on voters 
generally,” the standard of strict scrutiny did not apply. As a result, Justice Scalia did not 
weigh the “special burdens” against the state’s interest because the limited scope of the 
burden itself was enough to uphold the law.
24
 
 Justice Souter, who wrote the dissenting opinion, agreed with Justice Steven’s 
balancing approach. However, he did not believe the majority was rigorous enough in its 
inquiry of the “hard facts that the standard of review demands” in Burdick.25 The burdens 
Justice Stevens had identified were more substantial than he described. Justice Souter 
discussed in great detail the travel costs and fees associated with acquiring the necessary 
government-issued photo identification. He then described the difficulty some voters 
would have in gathering the appropriate documents to apply for such photo ID. 
Additionally, there was also the burden of having to travel to a local BMV office which, 
under certain circumstances, would require voters to travel great distances, especially in 
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rural counties which only one had BMV office.
26
 For Justice Souter, the provisional-
ballot exception did not “amount to much relief” in the face of these burdens.27 After all, 
in order for that provisional ballot to be counted, the voter would have to incur the same 
travel burdens associated with acquiring the necessary identification in the first place. 
Ultimately, Justice Souter believed the burdens were more severe than the majority 
described and, under the Burdick standard, the Indiana law was unconstitutional.  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford was met with widespread criticism, at 
least in the civil rights community and among election law experts. Many observers were 
especially troubled by how the Court reached its decision. As David Williams stated, 
“The Court inevitably makes its decision based on background assumptions and burdens 
of proof.” There was no evidence of voter fraud in Indiana, and like Justice Souter, many 
pointed out that photo ID requirements only address in-person voter impersonation. 
Documented instances of registration and absentee-ballot fraud, although few in number, 
did exist in Indiana and elsewhere but photo ID laws leave these problems “untouched.”28 
The Crawford decision had serious implications for future voter ID laws which rapidly 
grew in number across the nation. As the next sections will explain, Indiana’s photo ID 
law became a model for similar laws in others states. However, when states covered by 
Section 5 began adopting photo ID requirements, the debate surrounding these laws 
instantly became more complicated.  
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II. The Lone Star Controversy 
The voter identification law passed by the Texas state legislature in 2011 would 
have been the most stringent law of its kind in the nation. On March 12, 2012, in a letter 
signed by Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez, the Justice Department objected 
to the law.
29
 Afterwards, when Texas sought a declaratory judgment from a district court 
in Washington, D.C., a three-judge panel unanimously affirmed the Attorney General’s 
objection and denied preclearance under Section 5. Both the district court and the DOJ 
used the retrogression standard and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford in their 
assessment of the voter ID law. And both reached the same conclusion that the law would 
have a disproportionate effect on minorities in Texas who lacked the necessary photo ID.  
The Justice Department’s objection letter began by citing Crawford, “recognizing 
the state’s legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter 
confidence.”30 However, the letter mentioned that the state’s submission “did not include 
evidence of significant in-person voter impersonation not already addressed by the state’s 
existing laws.”31 Under the Beer standard, Texas had to show that its proposed voter ID 
law would not have a retrogressive effect when compared to its existing voter 
identification laws (i.e. the benchmark practice). The state failed to do so and using the 
state’s own data sets concerning registered voters without a driver’s license, the Justice 
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Department estimated that Hispanics made up anywhere between 29.0 percent and 38.2 
percent of registered voters who lacked the necessary photo identification.
32
 
The letter continued with an analysis of the only mitigating measure in the law, 
that the state’s Department of Public Safety would issue free election identification 
certificates to eligible voters. But, as Justice Souter argued with respect to a similar 
provision in Indiana’s law, acquiring these election certificates were no less burdensome 
than acquiring the requisite photo ID itself. As the letter explained, an applicant would 
have “to provide two pieces of secondary identification, or one piece of secondary 
identification and two supporting documents.”33 If this was not possible, “the least 
expensive option would be to spend $22 on a copy of the voter’s birth certificate.”34 
Apart from these financial costs, the letter cited other burdens such as traveling to a 
county DPS office, the problem being that in 81 of the state’s 254 counties, there were no 
operational driver’s license offices.35 Moreover, “Only 49 of the 221 currently open 
driver’s license offices across the state have extended hours.”36 Such burdens, as the 
Attorney General pointed out, were “particularly noteworthy given Texas’ geography and 
demographics which arguably make the necessity for mitigating measures greater than in 
other states.”37 In the face of such retrogression, the law was denied preclearance by the 
Justice Department. 
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When Texas sought a declaratory judgment from a district court in Washington, 
D.C., it argued that voter ID laws were not subject to the effects test of Section 5 because 
“such laws can never ‘deny[ ] or abridge[ ] the right to vote.’”38 According to the state, 
“Would-be voters who refuse to countenance even ‘minor inconveniences’ have chosen 
not to vote” and because the “choice lies with prospective voters, voting rights can hardly 
be considered to have been ‘denied’ or ‘abridged’ by the state.”39 However, Circuit Judge 
David S. Tatel, writing the opinion of the Court, rejected the argument for “completing 
miss[ing] the point of Section 5.”40 Referring to Allen, Judge Tatel reminded the state that 
Section 5 applied to all changes “no matter how small.” Then, citing the Court’s ruling in 
Beer, Judge Tatel emphasized that such changes could not result in a retrogressive effect. 
He concluded by saying, “If, as Texas argues, [the law] imposes only a ‘minor 
inconvenience’ on voters, the consequence of that argument is not that [the law] would be 
exempt from Section 5, but rather that it could easily be precleared because it would not 
undermine minorities ‘effective exercise of the electoral franchise.’”41 The district court 
refused to “collapse the entire retrogression analysis into a question of voter ‘choice.’”42  
The second argument Texas raised rested on the “equal sovereignty” of the states 
doctrine. According to that argument, “A state interest that is unquestionably legitimate 
for Indiana – without any concrete evidence of a problem – is unquestionably legitimate 
for Texas as well.”43 Judge Tatel responded by stating that Crawford did not control this 
case. As he explained, “In Crawford itself, the Court noted that it was ‘consider[ing] only 
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the statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters.’ Here, not only do we face different 
questions – does [Texas’ law] have discriminatory purpose or retrogressive effect – but 
we focus on the limited subset of voters who are racial and language minorities.”44 
However, Judge Tatel was not willing to accept the United States’ argument that 
Crawford was wholly irrelevant in this case. True, the law concerned a voter ID law 
passed in a state not covered by Section 5 but the Supreme Court’s findings regarding the 
effects of such laws had “obvious ramifications for Section 5 cases.”45 As Judge Tatel 
stated, “The upshot of all of this is that Texas can prove that its photo ID law lacks 
retrogressive effect even if a disproportionate number of minority voters in the state 
currently lack photo ID.” However, to do so, Texas also had to prove how these affected 
voters could easily obtain acceptable IDs without being unjustly burdened which it 
ultimately could not do.  
As Judge Tatel stated in his concluding remarks, Texas may have faced an 
“impossible burden” but that was because of the law Texas enacted.46 Interestingly 
enough though, his opinion listed five defeated amendments by the legislature which he 
believed “would have made this a far closer case.”47 Recognizing the controversial nature 
of the issue before him, Justice Tatel wrote, “Nothing in this opinion remotely suggests 
that Section 5 bars all covered jurisdictions from implementing photo ID laws.”48 This 
question of how Section 5 applied to voter ID laws grew more important as more states 
covered by the VRA passed voter ID legislation. However, as the next section will 
                                                 
44
 Id. at 20.  
45
 Texas (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) at 22. 
46
 Ibid at 56. 
47
 Ibid. Such amendments included reimbursing travel costs, waiving all fees for those who needed the 
election identification certificate and extending the hours of operation for DPS offices. 
48
 Ibid at 55. 
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discuss, the question also became more complicated when the DOJ and the courts began 
reaching different conclusions about voter ID laws in those states. 
III. Preclearance for the Palmetto State  
On May 18, 2011, Governor Nikki Haley of South Carolina signed Act R54, 
requiring voters in her state to present government-issued photo identification before they 
voted. The law was very similar to Texas’ voter ID law with a few, albeit very important 
exceptions. But, on December 23, 2011, the Attorney General objected to the law. In a 
letter signed by the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, the Justice Department 
was unable to conclude that the state met its burden under Section 5.
49
 Like Texas, South 
Carolina then sought a declaratory judgment from a district court in Washington, D.C. 
except this time, the district court granted the law preclearance. The fact that the district 
court granted preclearance for South Carolina’s law after the Attorney General initially 
objected to it suggests that assessing voter ID laws under Section 5 may not be as 
straightforward as one might assume.  
The Justice Department’s letter to South Carolina also cited the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Crawford and, as with the Texas objection letter, it also pointed out that the 
state did not include any evidence of voter fraud in its submission. Then, using the 
retrogression test from Beer, the DOJ began its analysis of the law’s impact on minority 
voters in South Carolina. According to the data provided by the state, the DOJ 
emphasized that 10.0% of non-white registered voters lacked any form of DMV-issued 
                                                 
49
 See Appendix 3.3, Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez to Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General C. Havird Jones, Jr., December 23, 2011. The Attorney General actually objected to 
South Carolina’s law before he interposed an objection to Texas’ law. However, Texas’ law was first to 
appear in a district court and, for that reason, we began with the Texas voter ID law.  
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ID.
50
 Although non-white voters comprised 30.4% of the state’s registered voters, they 
accounted for over a third of registered voters who did not have the required photo ID.
51
 
A county-by-county analysis by the Department further showed that across the state’s 46 
counties, “the rate of registered voters without DMV-issued identification ranged from a 
low of 6.3% to a high of 14.2%.” 52 These racial disparities in the proposed law clearly 
represented a retrogressive effect. All told, 81, 938 minority citizens already registered to 
vote would be rendered ineligible to participate in the elections if the identification 
requirements were implemented.
53
 
The Attorney General then addressed the “reasonable impediment provision” in 
the law. According to the law, “If the elector suffers from a reasonable impediment that 
prevents the elector from obtaining a photograph identification” he or she would sign an 
affidavit saying so and cast a provisional ballot.
54
 The ballot would ultimately be counted 
unless the election clerk or county commission had reason to believe the affidavit was 
false. However, in its submission, the state did not define what a “reasonable 
impediment” was nor did it provide “guidance regarding how this standard should be 
interpreted or applied.”55 Moreover, as the Attorney General wrote, “The exception’s 
vagueness raises the possibility that it will be applied differently from county to county, 
and possibly from polling place to polling place, and thus risks exacerbating rather than 
mitigating the retrogressive effect of the new requirements on minority voters.”56 As a 
                                                 
50
 Ibid, 2. 
51
 Id., 3. 
52
 DOJ letter (December 2011), 3. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
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result, the “reasonable impediment” provision was not a valid mitigating factor especially 
since its vagueness allowed for further retrogression. 
The law also provided free photo registration cards to every voter as well as 
training programs for poll workers and public education and outreach services regarding 
the new voter requirements. However, even though the Attorney General admitted that 
these provisions “could potentially mitigate the law’s discriminatory effects,” they were 
not under consideration because they were not final.
57
 The DOJ determined that the law 
disproportionately affected minority voters and that was all the Attorney General needed 
to deny the law preclearance.  
By the time the South Carolina voter ID law reached a district court in 
Washington, D.C., the state had adopted the guidelines and procedures the Attorney 
General inquired about in his objection letter. Nevertheless, the law remained the same 
and yet a three-judge panel unanimously granted the law preclearance. To begin with, the 
district court argued that under the new law, every voter would be able to cast a ballot 
regardless of the identification they provided. Voters who did not have a form of 
government-issued photo identification could continue to use their non-photo voter 
registration cards.
58
 Moreover, those non-photo registration cards could be used to obtain 
the new free photo-registration cards which under pre-existing law cost $5.
59
 In light of 
this, Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing the opinion of the court, concluded, “By 
                                                 
57
 DOJ letter (December 2011), 4. The Attorney General cannot make a determination for any changes that 
are not final or have not been adopted by the appropriate governing body.  
58
 The use on non-photo voter registration cards was a point the Attorney General did not address in his 
objection letter. 
59
 The new photo-registration cards were available at any county DMV office. As the district court 
mentioned, in South Carolina’s 46 counties, there is at least one DMV office. This is especially important 
considering in Texas, there were 81 counties which did not have an operational motor vehicle office.  
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allowing voters with non-photo registration cards to continue to vote without photo IDs, 
South Carolina specifically sought to alleviate the burden on voters who might not have 
obtained one of the qualifying IDs.”60 
Judge Kavanaugh then turned to perhaps the most important feature of the law: 
the reasonable impediment provision. According to the statements made by state 
legislators and the state attorney general, the reasonable impediment provision was meant 
“to be interpreted broadly” and “err in favor of the voter” “so as to accommodate voters 
currently without photo IDs.”61 As for what qualified as a reasonable impediment, the 
state argued that the “reasonableness of the listed impediment was to be determined by 
the individual voter, not by a poll manager or county board.”62 Despite these statements, 
as Judge Kavanaugh wrote, “The Department of Justice and the interveners have oddly 
resisted the expansive interpretation of [the photo ID law]. They have insisted that the 
broad interpretation of the reasonable impediment provision advanced by the South 
Carolina Attorney General and State Election Commission contravenes the statutory 
language.”63 However, the district court did not agree and thus accepted the reasonable 
impediment provision, as broadly interpreted by state officials, to be a condition of 
preclearance.  
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion also included a noteworthy comparison of South 
Carolina’s voter ID law to similar laws in other states (Indiana, Georgia, New Hampshire 
                                                 
60
 South Carolina v. Holder, No. 12-203, (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) at 23. 
61
 South Carolina  (D.D.C. October 10, 2012) at 7. 
62
 Ibid at 9. “Although county boards generally cannot second-guess whether the reason given was a 
“reasonable impediment” that prevented the voter from obtaining a photo ID, statements simply denigrating 
the law – such as, “I don’t want to” or “I hate this law” – need not be accepted. Nor need nonsensical 
statements such as, to borrow an absurd example given at trial, ‘The moon is made of green cheese, so I 
didn’t get a photo ID.’ The ability of county boards to police the outermost boundaries of the expansive 
reasonable impediment provision in this commonsense way does not affect our evaluation of law.” 
63
 Id. at 11. 
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and Texas). Because of the law’s “ameliorative measures,” Judge Kavanaugh asserted, “It 
is not an overstatement to describe South Carolina’s law as significantly more friendly to 
voters currently without qualifying photo IDs than the voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, 
New Hampshire and Texas.” 64 By providing provisional ballots to qualified voters and 
offering free photo identification cards, South Carolina’s voter ID law contained two key 
ameliorative provisions. The photo ID laws in Georgia and New Hampshire only 
contained one of these provisions and those in Indiana and Texas had neither of them.
65
 
Judge Kavanaugh made this comparison to show that South Carolina’s voter ID law was 
more ameliorative to voters without photo ID than other laws previously precleared by 
the DOJ and upheld by other courts.
66
 
 The district court’s decision to overturn the Attorney General’s objection and 
grant South Carolina preclearance for its voter ID law was very significant. If anything, it 
showed that applying the standards of Section 5 to photo ID laws can be very tricky. A 
simple retrogression test may not consider all parts of the law fairly, as was the case with 
South Carolina. As the district court argued, mitigating or ameliorative measures are 
important factors to take into consideration. Ultimately, not all photo ID laws are the 
same. Some, like the failed Texas law, are more restrictive than others like South 
Carolina’s law which makes every effort to include each voter. But as more covered 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 27.  
65
 Judge Kavanaugh emphasizes the use of provisional ballots in South Carolina because it “resembles the 
kind of affidavit requirement that the Department of Justice has agreed would not materially burden the 
right to vote” (18). See Appendix 3.1. 
66
 Judge Kavanaugh was aware that Texas’ law was denied preclearance but he included it in his analysis 
anyway in order to prove that if the voter ID laws from those states were “placed on a spectrum of 
stringency, South Carolina’s clearly would fall on the less stringent end” (27). In a brief concurring 
opinion, District Judge John Bates interestingly observed, “Without the review process under the Voting 
Rights Act, South Carolina’s voter photo ID law certainly would have been more restrictive.” 
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states begin to enact photo ID laws of their own, it is likely the DOJ and the courts will 
come into conflict with each other again. 
IV. The ID Epidemic and DOJ Credibility 
In 2005, Georgia became the first state to require its voters to present a valid form 
of government-issued photo identification before voting. Using Judge Kavanaugh’s 
“spectrum of stringency” from the South Carolina case, Georgia’s photo ID law is among 
the strictest of its kind in the nation. The law significantly reduced the list of acceptable 
forms of identification to six government-issued IDs and eliminated the affidavit for 
voters who did not have the necessary ID.
67
 To the surprise of many, the Department of 
Justice approved the law. However, a leaked internal memo indicated serious divisions 
between the career staff and political appointees in the Voting Section. The controversy 
that ensued represented what many saw as an increased polarization in the DOJ’s 
preclearance decisions. More recently, this polarization has become more pronounced 
after a 258-page report by the Inspector General found that “high partisan stakes 
associated with some of the statutes that the Voting Section enforces have contributed to 
polarization and mistrust within the Section.”68  Voter ID laws like Georgia’s have 
highlighted these divisions which undermine the DOJ’s credibility at a time when the 
DOJ’s role in enforcing the VRA has come into question.    
The memo that was drafted by members of the career staff, including the 
Section’s Deputy Chief, was a comprehensive and very detailed analysis of the state’s 
                                                 
67
 Voters who did not have the necessary photo identification could cast a provisional ballot. However, in 
order for the ballot to be counted, they had to show the election registrar the required ID within 48 hours. 
68
 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Operations of the Voting 
Section of the Civil Rights Division” (March 2013), 251. 
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photo ID law. The 51-page memo considered everything from vehicle access to the costs 
of each form of acceptable photo ID. Ultimately, the memo concluded that Georgia did 
not meet its burden under Beer nor did the state “demonstrate that it could not satisfy its 
stated goal of combating voter fraud while avoiding retrogression.”69 The memo did 
include specific “nonretrogressive alternatives” that the law did not consider such as 
retaining the affidavit or at least some of the various forms of ID acceptable under the 
existing law. The absence of such ameliorative measures however “weighed strongly in 
favor of interposing an objection.”70 Nevertheless, John Tanner, the heavily criticized 
Chief of the Voting Section, granted the law preclearance.
71
 When the law was struck 
down by a district court later that year, the state repealed the law and passed a revised 
statute which was granted preclearance again and subsequently upheld by a circuit court 
of appeals in 2009.
72
 
The controversy surrounding the Georgia voter ID law was concerning for those 
already skeptical of the DOJ’s enforcement policies and the partisan motivations that 
came to influence its decisions. Although the law was eventually struck down and 
replaced with a “less retrogressive” one, the incident demonstrated just how contentious 
the debate is concerning photo ID laws. As previous sections have explained, the debate 
has grown more intense as more states begin implementing these laws and as the DOJ’s 
role in enforcing the VRA becomes more dubious.  
                                                 
69
 U.S. Department of Justice, Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division, “Section 5 Recommendation 
Memorandum” (August 25, 2005), 33. 
70
 DOJ Memo (August 2005), 35. 
71
 John Tanner later resigned in 2007 after controversial remarks he made regarding the impact of voter 
identification requirements on minority voters.  
72
 See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 07-14664 (11
th
 Cir. Jan. 14, 2009). The revised law 
reinstated the use of affidavits and slightly expanded the list of acceptable forms of identification. 
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***** 
If we recall, the first generation of voting rights cases dealt with issues of literacy 
tests and poll taxes which were questions about access to the ballot. As we have seen in 
this chapter, voter identification laws are also essentially about ballot access. In each case 
we examined in this chapter, the courts and the DOJ have often rested their objections on 
the evidence that minority voters were disproportionately affected by photo ID laws 
because they lacked the necessary identification. Those laws which were upheld often 
had mitigating factors and ameliorative measures which offset the retrogressive effect of 
those laws. However, as we saw in the case of South Carolina, the courts and the DOJ 
have sometimes reached different conclusions on certain voter ID laws using the same 
retrogression standard established in Beer.  
The Crawford decision confirmed that states had a legitimate interest to protect 
the integrity of their elections and safeguard electoral confidence. Even in the absence of 
any evidence of voter fraud, the Supreme Court found a voter identification law to be a 
justifiable burden on the right to vote. Nevertheless, only two states fully covered by 
Section 5 have strict photo identification requirements in place.
73
 Indeed, the only voter 
ID law that the Department of Justice has approved was New Hampshire’s in 2012.74  
However, the DOJ is currently reviewing two photo ID laws from Alabama and Virginia.  
                                                 
73
 See Appendix 2. Arizona allows voters to substitute a form of photo identification with two forms of 
non-photo documentary identification.  
74
 See Appendix 3.1, Letter from T. Christian Herren, Chief of Voting Section to J. Gerald Hebert 
(September 4, 2012). Technically, New Hampshire does not qualify as a state fully covered by Section 5 
since only a handful of townships in the state are covered. However, whenever a statewide law is passed 
which results in a change in voting practice or procedure, the state must obtain preclearance from the DOJ 
first. 
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Although this third generation of voting rights deals with the same fundamental 
question of ballot access as the first generation, the primary difference is the relationship 
between the courts and the DOJ. During the first generation, the courts afforded Congress 
and the Justice Department great deference with respect to their enforcement powers 
under the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court granted Congress and the DOJ 
significant authority and supported their actions under the Act. But, more recently, the 
courts and the Justice Department do not appear to be of the same opinion. The South 
Carolina photo ID law is the best example. However, because these photo ID laws are 
relatively new, it is difficult to predict how the courts and the DOJ will treat these laws as 
more begin to appear across the country.  
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Conclusion 
During oral arguments in Shelby County v. Holder, Chief Justice John Roberts 
indicated that out of the 3, 700 preclearance requests made in 2005, the Attorney General 
issued only one objection. The point he was trying to make was one that many critics of 
the Voting Rights Act have raised in recent years, namely, that Section 5 has served its 
purpose. Of course, no one doubts the tremendous success of the VRA. As Chief Justice 
Roberts himself pointed out in 2009, “Voter turnout and registration rates now approach 
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority 
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” However, discrimination in the electoral 
system still exists even if it as not as blatant as it was nearly fifty years ago. To quote 
Justice Stephen Breyer, “[Discrimination] is an old disease, it’s gotten better, a lot better, 
a lot better, but it’s still there.” 
With voter identification requirements, we have come full circle since 1965 by 
returning to the fundamental question of ballot access. However, unlike the first 
generation, this third generation promises to be more confrontational for the courts and 
the Department of Justice. Previous interpretations of the Act and indeed the Act itself 
appear to be in jeopardy given the ideological leanings of the Supreme Court and the 
perceived increase of polarization in the DOJ’s decisions.  As we await the Court’s 
decision in the recent constitutional challenge to the VRA, I submit that the statute will 
be dramatically weakened if not struck down entirely. Even if the Court somehow 
upholds Section 5, it is likely the Court will strike down the coverage formula in Section 
4 and force Congress to determine which states and jurisdictions should still remain 
under the supervision of the federal government. However, such a task is politically 
92 
 
infeasible and many argue that such a ruling by the Court would be the equivalent of 
striking down the statute entirely. Nevertheless, whatever the Court decides, we can say 
with certainty that the future of voting rights enforcement will be very different from 
what is today. 
And so, at a time when the Court appears ready to strike down the Voting Rights 
Act, voter ID laws reminds us that discrimination still exists in our elections. The partisan 
interests at stake over these voter suppressive laws and the ever-present reality of partisan 
gerrymandering are evidence of that.  Unfortunately, the hopeful wishing of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren remains unfulfilled as we still “look forward to the day when truly ‘the right 
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”  
  
Appendix 1: Table of Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions 
Source: Redrawing the Lines 
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Appendix 2: Details of Voter Identification Requirements in Covered States 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures  
  
State Requirement Acceptable Forms of ID Voters Without ID 
Alabama 
§17-9-30 
  
NOTE:  AL's new photo 
ID law is scheduled to 
take effect for the 2014 
primary election. It also 
requires preclearance by 
the USDOJ. 
Existing Law: 
Each elector shall 
provide identification to 
an appropriate election 
official prior to voting. 
New Law: 
Each elector shall 
provide valid photo 
identification to an 
appropriate election 
official prior to voting. 
Existing Law: 
 Government-issued photo ID 
 U.S. passport 
 U.S. military ID 
 Employee ID card with photo 
 Alabama college/university 
ID with photo 
 Alabama hunting or fishing 
license 
 Alabama gun permit 
 FAA-issued pilot's license 
 Birth certificate (certified 
copy) 
 Social security card 
 Naturalization document 
 Court record of adoption or 
name change 
 Medicaid or Medicare card 
 Electronic benefits transfer 
card 
 Utility bill, bank statement, 
government check, paycheck 
or government document 
showing name and address of 
voter 
New Law: 
 Valid Alabama driver's 
license or non-driver ID card 
 Valid photo voter ID card or 
other valid ID card issued by 
any state or the federal 
government , as long as it 
contains a photo 
 Valid U.S. passport 
 Valid government employee 
ID card with a photo 
 Valid student or employee ID 
card issued by a college or 
university in the state, 
provided it includes a photo 
 Valid U.S. military ID card 
containing a photo 
 Valid tribal ID card 
containing a photo 
Existing Law: 
Vote a challenged or 
provisional ballot or 
vote, if s/he is identified 
by two poll workers as 
an eligible a voter on the 
poll list, and both poll 
workers sign the voting 
sign-in register by the 
voter’s name. 
New Law: 
Vote a provisional ballot 
or vote a regular ballot if 
s/he is identified by two 
election officials as an 
eligible voter on the poll 
list, and both election 
workers sign a sworn 
affidavit so stating. 
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Alaska 
§15.15.225 
 
Before being allowed to 
vote, each voter shall 
exhibit to an election 
official one form of 
identification. 
 Official voter registration 
card 
 Driver's license 
 Birth certificate 
 Passport 
 Hunting or fishing license 
 Current utility bill, bank 
statement, paycheck, 
government check or other 
government document with 
the voter’s name and address 
An election official may 
waive the identification 
requirement if the 
election official knows 
the identity of the 
voter. A voter who 
cannot exhibit a required 
form of identification 
shall be allowed to vote 
a questioned ballot. 
Arizona 
§16-579(A) 
  
Every qualified elector 
shall present one form 
of identification that 
bears the name, address 
and photograph of the 
elector or two different 
forms of identification 
that bear the name and 
address of the elector.  
 Valid Arizona driver's license 
 Valid Arizona non-driver 
identification 
 Tribal enrollment card or 
other form of tribal 
identification 
 Valid U.S. federal, state or 
local government issued 
identification 
 Utility bill dated within 90 
days of the election 
 Bank or credit union 
statement dated within 90 
days of the election 
 Valid Arizona vehicle 
registration 
 Indian census card 
 Property tax statement 
 Vehicle insurance card 
 Recorder’s Certificate 
An elector who does not 
provide the required 
identification shall 
receive a provisional 
ballot. Provisional 
ballots are counted only 
if the elector provides 
identification to the 
county recorder by 5pm 
on the fifth business day 
after a general election 
that includes an election 
for federal office, or by 
5pm on the third 
business day after any 
other election. 
Georgia 
§21-2-417 
Each elector shall 
present proper 
identification to a poll 
worker at or prior to 
completion of a voter's 
certificate at any polling 
place and prior to such 
person's admission to 
the enclosed space at 
such polling place. 
 Georgia driver’s license, even 
if expired 
 ID card issued by the state of 
Georgia or the federal 
government 
 Free voter ID card issued by 
the state or county 
 U.S. passport 
 Valid employee ID card 
containing a photograph from 
any branch, department, 
agency, or entity of the U.S. 
Government, Georgia, or any 
county, municipality, board, 
authority or other entity of 
this state 
 Valid U.S. military 
identification card 
 Valid tribal photo ID 
If you show up to vote 
and you do not have one 
of the acceptable forms 
of photo identification, 
you can still vote a 
provisional ballot.  You 
will have up to three 
days after the election to 
present appropriate 
photo identification at 
your county registrar's 
office in order for your 
provisional ballot to be 
counted. 
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Louisiana 
§18:562 
Each applicant shall 
identify himself, in the 
presence and view of the 
bystanders, and present 
identification to the 
commissioners. 
 Louisiana driver’s license 
 Louisiana special ID card 
 Other generally recognized 
picture identification 
If the applicant does not 
have identification, s/he 
shall sign an affidavit to 
that effect before the 
commissioners, and the 
applicant shall provide 
further identification by 
presenting his current 
registration certificate, 
giving his date of birth 
or providing other 
information stated in the 
precinct register that is 
requested by the 
commissioners. 
 However, an applicant 
that is allowed to vote 
without the picture 
identification required 
by this Paragraph is 
subject to challenge as 
provided in R.S. 18:565. 
Mississippi 
§23-15-563 
Mississippi's voter ID 
law  requires USDOJ pre-
clearance before it can 
take effect. 
NOTE: Mississippi's 
voter ID law is not in 
effect for the November 
2012 election. 
 
An elector who votes in 
person in a primary or 
general election shall 
present government-
issued photo 
identification before 
being allowed to vote. 
Voters who live and 
vote in a state-licensed 
care facility are exempt. 
NOTE: Mississippi's voter ID law is 
not in effect for the November 2012 
election. 
 
Mississippi's new constitutional 
amendment simply says "government-
issued photo identification." 
Implementing legislation and/or 
administrative rules will be necessary 
to define precisely what this means. 
NOTE: Mississippi's 
voter ID law is not in 
effect for the November 
2012 election. 
 
An individual without ID 
can cast an affidavit 
ballot which will be 
counted if the individual 
returns to the appropriate 
circuit clerk within five 
days after the election 
and shows government-
issued photo ID. 
Voters with a religious 
objection to being 
photographed may vote 
an affidavit ballot, which 
will be counted if the 
voter returns to the 
appropriate circuit clerk 
within five days after the 
election and executes an 
affidavit that the 
religious exemption 
applies. 
South Carolina 
§7-13-710 
When a person presents 
himself to vote, he shall 
produce a valid and 
current ID. 
  
 South Carolina driver's 
license 
 Photo ID card issued by the 
SC Dept. of Motor Vehicles 
 Passport 
 Military ID bearing a photo 
If you have a reasonable 
impediment to obtaining 
Photo ID, you may vote 
a provisional ballot after 
showing your non-photo 
voter registration card.  
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issued by the federal 
government 
 South Carolina voter 
registration card with a photo 
Voters who have a reasonable 
impediment to obtaining photo ID 
may show a non-photo voter 
registration card in lieu of photo ID, 
sign an affidavit attesting to the 
impediment, and cast a provisional 
ballot. 
Texas 
Election Code §63.001 et 
seq. 
  
NOTE:  TX's new photo 
ID law takes effect after 
preclearance by the 
USDOJ. Pre-clearance 
was denied on March 13, 
2012, and the state is 
expected to apply for 
reconsideration from the 
Federal District Court of 
Washington, D.C. 
Existing law: 
On offering to vote, a 
voter must present the 
voter’s voter registration 
certificate to an election 
officer at the polling 
place. 
New law: 
On offering to vote, a 
voter must present to an 
election officer at the 
polling place one form 
of identification.  
Existing law: 
Voter registration certificate 
 Driver’s license 
 Department of Public Safety 
ID card 
 A form of ID containing the 
person’s photo that 
establishes the person’s 
identity 
 A birth certificate or other 
document confirming birth 
that is admissible in a court 
of law and establishes the 
person’s identity 
 U.S. citizenship papers 
 A U.S. passport 
 Official mail addressed to the 
person, by name, from a 
governmental entity 
 A copy of a current utility 
bill, bank statement, 
government check, paycheck, 
or other government 
document that shows the 
person’s name and address 
 Any other form of ID 
prescribed by the secretary of 
state 
New law: 
 Driver's license 
 Election identification 
certificate 
 Dept. of Public Safety 
personal ID card 
 U.S. military ID 
 U.S. citizenship certificate 
 U.S. passport 
Existing law: 
A voter who does not 
present a voter 
registration certificate 
when offering to vote, 
but whose name is on the 
list of registered voters 
for the precinct in which 
the voter is offering to 
vote, shall be accepted 
for voting if the voter 
executes an affidavit 
stating that the voter 
does not have the voter’s 
voter registration 
certificate in the voter’s 
possession and the voter 
presents other proof of 
identification. A voter 
who does not present a 
voter registration 
certificate and cannot 
present other 
identification may vote a 
provisional ballot. A 
voter who does not 
present a voter 
registration certificate 
and whose name is not 
on the list of registered 
voters may vote a 
provisional ballot. 
New law: 
A voter who fails to 
present the required 
identification may cast a 
provisional ballot.  
The voter must present, 
not later than the sixth 
day after the date of the 
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 License to carry a concealed 
handgun issued by the Dept. 
of Public Safety 
All of the above must include a photo 
of the voter. With the exception of the 
certificate of citizenship, these forms 
of ID cannot be expired, or cannot 
have expired more than 60 days before 
the election.  
election, the required 
form of identification to 
the voter registrar for 
examination OR the 
voter may execute, in the 
presence of the voter 
registrar, an affidavit 
under penalty of perjury 
stating that the voter has 
a religious objection to 
being photographed or 
that the voter does not 
have identification as a 
result of a natural 
disaster declared by the 
president or the governor 
which occurred not 
earlier than 45 days 
before the date the ballot 
was cast.  
Virginia 
§24.2-643(B) 
 
NOTE:  Beginning on 
July 1, 2014, Virginia law 
will require a photo ID in 
order to vote. 
  
The officer shall ask the 
voter to present any one 
of the specified forms of 
identification. 
Existing law: 
 Virginia voter registration 
card 
 Social Security card 
 Valid Virginia driver's 
license 
 Any other identification card 
issued by a government 
agency of the 
Commonwealth, one of its 
political subdivisions, or the 
United States 
 Employee identification card 
containing a photograph 
 Any valid student ID card 
issued by any institution of 
higher education located in 
Virginia 
 Copy of a current utility bill, 
bank statement, government 
check or paycheck that shows 
the name and address of the 
voter 
 Concealed handgun permit 
New law (all must be current and valid 
and bear a photo of the voter):  
 Virginia voter registration 
card 
 United States passport 
 Virginia driver's license 
 Any other identification card 
Any voter who does not 
show one of the forms of 
identification specified 
in this subsection shall 
be offered a provisional 
ballot marked ID-ONLY 
that requires no follow-
up action by the registrar 
or electoral board other 
than matching submitted 
identification documents 
from the voter for the 
electoral board to make a 
determination on 
whether to count the 
ballot. In order to have 
his or her ballot counted, 
the voter must submit a 
copy of one of the forms 
of identification to the 
electoral board by 
facsimile, electronic 
mail, in-person 
submission, or timely 
United States Postal 
Service or commercial 
mail delivery, to be 
received by the electoral 
board no later than noon 
on the third day after the 
election. 
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issued by a government 
agency of the 
Commonwealth, one of its 
political subdivisions, or the 
United States 
 Concealed handgun permit 
 Any valid student ID card 
issued by any institution of 
higher education located in 
Virginia 
 Employee identification card 
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51.52(c). With regard to Sections 9 and 14 of S.B. 14, concerning photographic identification 
requirements for in-person voting and acceptable forms of photographic identification, I cannot 
conclude that the state has sustained its burden under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Therefore, on behalf of the Attorney General, I must object to Sections 9 and 14 of S.B. 14. 
        We start our analysis recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud 
and safeguarding voter confidence. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 
(2008). In that vein, the state’s sole justifications for changing the current practice to require 
photographic identification to vote in person that appear in the legislative proceedings and are 
presented in its submission are to ensure electoral integrity and deter ineligible voters from 
voting. At the same time, we note that the state’s submission did not include evidence of 
significant in-person voter impersonation not already addressed by the state’s existing laws. 
        The voting changes at issue must be measured against the benchmark practice to 
determine whether they would “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 
130, 141 (1976). In support of its position that this proposed requirement will not have such a 
prohibited effect, the state provided two sets of registered-voter data, which were matched with 
two different data sources maintained by the state’s Department of Public Safety (DPS). One set 
was current as of September 16, 2011, and the other as of early January 2012. The September 
data reported that there were 12,780,841 registered voters, of whom 2,785,227 (21.8%) were 
Hispanic. The January data reported that there were 12,892,280 registered voters, of whom 
2,810,869 (21.8%) were Hispanic. 
         There is, however, a significant difference between the two data sets with regard to the 
number and characteristics of those registered voters without a driver’s license or personal 
identification card issued by DPS. The September data indicate that 603,892 (4.7%) of the 
state’s registered voters do not have such identification; this population consists of 174,866 
voters (29.0% of the 603,892 voters) who are Hispanic and 429,026 voters (71.0%) who are non- 
Hispanic. The January data indicate that 795,955 (6.2%) of the state’s registered voters do not 
have such identification; this population consists of 304,389 voters (38.2%) who are Hispanic 
and 491,566 voters (61.8%) who are non-Hispanic. The state has not provided an explanation 
for the disparate results. More significantly, it declined to offer an opinion on which of the two 
data sets is more accurate. Accordingly, we have considered both in reviewing your submission. 
        Starting our analysis with the September data set, 6.3 percent of Hispanic registered 
voters do not have the forms of identification described above, but only 4.3 percent of non- 
Hispanic registered voters are similarly situated. Therefore, a Hispanic voter is 46.5 percent 
more likely than a non-Hispanic voter to lack these forms of identification. In addition, although 
Hispanic voters represent only 21.8 percent of the registered voters in the state, Hispanic voters 
represent fully 29.0 percent of the registered voters without such identification. 
       Our analysis of the January data indicates that 10.8 percent of Hispanic registered voters 
do not have a driver’s license or personal identification card issued by DPS, but only 4.9 percent 
of non-Hispanic registered voters do not have such identification. So, Hispanic registered voters 
are more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic registered voters to lack such identification. Under 
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the data provided in January, Hispanics make up only 21.8 percent of all registered voters, but 
fully 38.2 percent of the registered voters who lack these forms of identification. 
        Thus, we conclude that the total number of registered voters who lack a driver’s license 
or personal identification card issued by DPS could range from 603,892 to 795,955. The 
disparity between the percentages of Hispanics and non-Hispanics who lack these forms of 
identification ranges from 46.5 to 120.0 percent. That is, according to the state’s own data, a 
Hispanic registered voter is at least 46.5 percent, and potentially 120.0 percent, more likely than 
a non-Hispanic registered voter to lack this identification. Even using the data most favorable to 
the state, Hispanics disproportionately lack either a driver’s license or a personal identification 
card issued by DPS, and that disparity is statistically significant. 
        The state has provided no data on whether African American or Asian registered voters 
are also disproportionately affected by S.B. 14. 
        Sections 9 and 14 of S.B. 14 would also permit a voter to vote in person using military 
photographic identification, a United States citizenship certificate that contains the person’s 
photograph, a United States passport, or a license to carry a concealed handgun. The state has 
produced no data showing what percent of registered voters lack a driver’s license or personal 
identification card issued by DPS, but do possess another allowable form of photographic 
identification. Nor has the state provided any data on the demographic makeup of such voters. 
In addition, when the Texas Legislature was considering S.B. 14, there were a number of 
legislative proposals to expand the forms of identification that could be used by voters to meet 
this new requirement – including proposals to allow any state-issued or tribal identification with 
a photograph to be used for regular voting – but those proposals were rejected. 
        In view of the statistical evidence illustrating the impact of S.B. 14 on Hispanic registered 
voters, we turn to those steps that the state has identified it will take to mitigate that effect. 
        You have informed us that the DPS-issued “free” election identification certificate, which 
is proposed to be implemented by Section 20 of S.B. 14, would protect voters who do not already 
have another acceptable form of identification. The application process for these certificates will 
mirror the manner in which a person obtains a driver’s license. First-time applicants will be 
required to furnish various supplemental documents and undergo an application process that 
includes fingerprinting and traveling to a driver’s license office. 
        An applicant for an election identification certificate will be required to provide two 
pieces of secondary identification, or one piece of secondary identification and two supporting 
documents. If a voter does not possess any of these documents, the least expensive option will 
be to spend $22 on a copy of the voter’s birth certificate. There is a statistically significant 
correlation between the Hispanic population percentage of a county and the percentage of a 
county’s population that lives below the poverty line. The legislature tabled amendments that 
would have prohibited state agencies from charging for any underlying documents needed to 
obtain an acceptable form of photographic identification. 
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        As noted above, an applicant for an election identification certificate will have to travel to 
a driver’s license office. This raises three discrete issues. First, according to the most recent 
American Community Survey three-year estimates, 7.3 percent of Hispanic or Latino households 
do not have an available vehicle, as compared with only 3.8 percent of non-Hispanic white 
households that lack an available vehicle. Statistically significant correlations exist between the 
Hispanic voting-age population percentage of a county, and the percentage of occupied housing 
units without a vehicle. 
        Second, in 81 of the state’s 254 counties, there are no operational driver’s license offices. 
The disparity in the rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanics with regard to the possession of 
either a driver’s license or personal identification card issued by DPS is particularly stark in 
counties without driver’s license offices. According to the September 2011 data, 10.0 percent of 
Hispanics in counties without driver’s license offices do not have either form of identification, 
compared to 5.5 percent of non-Hispanics. According to the January 2012 data, that comparison 
is 14.6 percent of Hispanics in counties without driver’s license offices, as compared to 8.8 
percent of non-Hispanics. During the legislative hearings, one senator stated that some voters in 
his district could have to travel up to 176 miles roundtrip in order to reach a driver’s license 
office. The legislature tabled amendments that would have, for example, provided 
reimbursement to voters who live below the poverty line for travel expenses incurred in applying 
for the requisite identification. 
        The third and final point is the limited hours that such offices are open. Only 49 of the 
221 currently open driver’s license offices across the state have extended hours. Even Senator 
Troy Fraser, the primary author of this legislation in the Senate, acknowledged during the 
legislative hearing that, “You gotta work to make sure that [DPS offices] are open.” Despite the 
apparent recognition of the situation, the legislature tabled an amendment that would have 
required driver’s license offices to be open until 7:00 p.m. or later on at least one weekday and 
during four or more hours on at least two Saturdays each month. 
        The legislation mandates a statewide voter-education effort concerning the new 
identification requirement, but does not provide specific standards for the program. The state, 
however, has yet to approve a final version of the materials designed to accomplish that goal, 
either for voters or for election officials. The state has indicated that it will implement a new 
educational program; but as of this date, our information indicates that the currently proposed 
plan will incorporate the new identification requirement into a general voter-education program. 
        The legislation requires that poll-worker training materials reflect the new identification 
requirements. This is particularly vital because a poll-worker can permit a voter to cast a ballot 
if the name as listed on the documentation is “substantially similar to but does not match 
exactly” the name on the voter registration list, and if the voter also submits an affidavit stating 
that he or she is the person on the list of registered voters. Though the Secretary of State’s office 
has adopted an administrative rule to guide poll-workers in determining when names are 
substantially similar, the rule gives poll-workers a great deal of discretion. The state has 
provided no enforcement guidelines to prevent the vagueness of this standard from leading to 
inconsistency or bias in its application. 
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        Even after submitting data that show over 600,000 registered voters do not have either a 
driver’s license or personal identification card issued by DPS – and that a disproportionate share 
of those registered voters are Hispanic – the state has failed to propose, much less adopt, any 
program for individuals who have to travel a significant distance to a DPS office, who have 
limited access to transportation, or who are unable to get to a DPS office during their hours of 
operation. This failure is particularly noteworthy given Texas’s geography and demographics, 
which arguably make the necessity for mitigating measures greater than in other states. The state 
also has not developed any specific proposals to educate either voters about how to comply with 
the new identification requirement or poll officials about how to enforce the proposed change. 
        In conclusion, the state has not met its burden of proving that, when compared to the 
benchmark, the proposed requirement will not have a retrogressive effect, or that any specific 
features of the proposed law will prevent or mitigate that retrogression. Additionally, the state 
has failed to demonstrate why it could not meet its stated goals of ensuring electoral integrity and 
deterring ineligible voters from voting in a manner that would have avoided this retrogressive 
effect. Because we conclude that the state has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the 
proposed law will not have a retrogressive effect, we do not make any determination as to 
whether the state has established that the proposed changes were adopted with no discriminatory 
purpose. 
        Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the submitting authority has the burden of 
showing that a submitted change has neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory 
effect. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); 28 C.F.R. 51.52. In light of the 
considerations discussed above, I cannot conclude that your burden has been sustained in this 
instance. Therefore, on behalf of the Attorney General, I must object to the changes affecting 
voting that are occasioned by Sections 9 and 14 of Chapter 123 (S.B. 14) (2011). Sections 1 
through 8, 10 through 13, 15, and 17 through 22 of S.B. 14 are directly related to the procedures 
for implementing the photographic identification requirements, including registration procedures, 
provisional-ballot procedures, notice requirements, and education and training requirements. 
Accordingly, no determination by the Attorney General is required or appropriate under Section 
5. 28 C.F.R. 51.22 and 51.35. 
        We note that under Section 5 you have the right to seek a declaratory judgment from the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia that these proposed changes neither 
have the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 28 C.F.R. 51.44. In addition, you may 
request that the Attorney General reconsider the objection. 28 C.F.R. 51.45. However, until the 
objection is withdrawn or a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia is obtained, the submitted changes continue to be legally unenforceable. Clark v. 
Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991); 28 C.F.R. 51.10. To enable us to meet our responsibility to 
enforce the Voting Rights Act, please inform us of the action that the State of Texas plans to take 
concerning this matter. If you have any questions, you should contact Robert S. Berman 
(202/514-8690), a deputy chief in the Voting Section. 
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